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 International Taxation and the Organizational Form  




We examine the association between international taxation and the organizational form a 
multinational corporation (MNC) selects for foreign direct investment (FDI). Using micro-
level data on inbound FDI relations in Germany, we find that a higher tax burden on foreign 
income earned in a corporate subsidiary increases the probability of selecting a non-corporate 
flow-through. This effect, which is economically meaningful, varies with an MNC’s income-
shifting opportunities, industry-specific risk, country-level differences in regulatory quality, 
and prior host-country experience. In addition, we find that selecting a flow-through because 
of a tax benefit is associated with lower investment and a more complex group structure. Our 
results inform policy makers about how MNCs might respond to tax-law changes in their 
organizational form choices and suggest that the differential taxation of subsidiaries and 
flow-throughs could have economic consequences for MNCs and their affiliates.   
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1 Introduction 
We examine the association between taxes levied on cross-border economic activities 
(international taxation) and the organizational form a multinational corporation (MNC) selects 
for foreign direct investment (FDI).1 We also explore whether the chosen organizational form 
has economic consequences for the MNC. Cross-border economic activities of MNCs and the 
associated group structures have two sides. On the one hand, group structures with affiliates 
in multiple countries arise from FDI that stimulates economic growth and development 
(UNCTAD 2017). On the other hand, these structures enable an MNC to shift income to tax 
havens and to exploit loopholes in tax systems.2 Despite prior research showing that 
international taxation influences the location of foreign affiliates (Dyreng, Lindsey, Markle, 
and Shackelford 2015) and the design of internal ownership chains (Lewellen and Robinson 
2013), we know little about how international taxation affects an MNC when selecting an 
organizational form for a new affiliate in the FDI host country.  
Understanding the effect of international taxation on organizational form choices of an 
MNC is important for several reasons. First, worldwide net FDI inflows ranged from $1.4 to 
$3.1 trillion between 2005 and 2013 (World Bank 2018) and MNCs have to select an 
organizational form for these investments. Second, current initiatives to reform the 
international tax system, such as the OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS), have the potential to alter the taxation of organizational forms (OECD 2013). Since 
organizational forms differ in their non-tax characteristics (Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson 1996; 
Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin 2014), selecting an organizational 
form because of a tax consequences could affect subsequent economic decisions, such as 
                                                 
1 International taxation includes all taxes levied on foreign income (Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodème 2008, 
Huizinga and Voget 2009, Barrios, Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodème 2012). We discuss international taxation in 
Section 2.1 and in Appendix B.  
2 Dutch regulatory filings suggest that Google saved $3.6 billion in taxes in 2015 using a group structure named 
“Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich” (Wood 2016). This structure has been used by several other MNCs (e.g., 
Apple; see Ram 2016).  
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investment or risk-taking. Thus, assessing the relation between international taxation and the 
organizational form choices of MNCs provides insights into the potential impact of tax-policy 
changes on these decisions. Finally, shedding light on the economic consequences of 
organizational form choices facilitates the design of targeted tax rules.  
When establishing a new affiliate in the FDI host country, a foreign investing entity 
can choose between the organizational forms of a corporate subsidiary and a non-corporate 
flow-through. International taxation determines the tax burden on income earned in the host 
country and shapes the tax costs and benefits of organizational forms (see Figure 1). Since 
the dividend-withholding tax only applies to dividend distributions of a subsidiary, this tax is 
the main tax cost (benefit) of a subsidiary (flow-through). Non-tax costs and benefits mainly 
stem from differences in liability exposure where a subsidiary is legally independent from 
the rest of the MNC, limiting liability of the investing entity (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 
1994, Ayers et al. 1996). Further, although a subsidiary implies higher compliance 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Love, and Maksimovic 2006, Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Martinez Peria 
2007) and coordination costs (Goolsbee and Maydew 2002), transferring ownership in a 
subsidiary is less costly than in a flow-through. As the MNC selects the organizational form 
with the best cost-benefit relation (Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver 2003), we expect the 
investing entity to be sensitive to international taxation. Thus, we predict that the likelihood 
of establishing a new affiliate as a flow-through is positively associated with the tax cost of a 
subsidiary.  
Prior research provides evidence that taxes affect organizational form choices in 
domestic settings (see Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for a review). MNCs, however, differ 
from domestic or standalone firms along several dimensions. First, unlike domestic firms, an 
MNC could reduce dividend-withholding taxes prior to the organizational form choice by 
establishing the new affiliate in a host country that lightly taxes dividend distributions 
(Dyreng et al. 2015). Second, by operating in several taxing jurisdictions, an MNC could 
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shift taxable income across border (Hines and Rice 1994, Klassen and Laplante 2012) and 
limit an affiliate’s exposure to international taxation. Third, an MNC has greater market 
power than a domestic firm and could shift the economic burden of international taxation to 
its stakeholders (Dyreng, Jacob, Jiang, and Müller 2019). These differences cast doubt on 
whether international taxation is associated with organizational form choices of MNCs and 
suggest that there is support for the null hypothesis 
In our empirical tests, we examine foreign investing entities that establish a new 
affiliate in Germany, our host country of interest.3 Germany is a powerful setting because the 
extensive double tax treaty network implies variation in the tax burden difference between 
organizational forms based on the home country of the investing entity. At the same time, all 
organizational form choices occur in the identical regulatory environment. Further, since 
most existing tax systems are based on common principles (Barrios et al. 2012), the tax 
effects of international taxation and our findings generalize to several country combinations.  
We use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of the Deutsche Bundesbank as 
our primary data source. This dataset reports anonymized micro-level data on the stock of 
inbound FDI relations in Germany. As a key advantage, the MiDi database contains the 
organizational form of these FDI relations, which is unavailable in most conventional 
datasets. Our initial sample includes 2,182 organizational form choices for the years 2005-
2013. Investing entities establishing a new affiliate belong to an MNC and are located in 59 
home countries. These countries account for more than 99 percent of all inbound FDI 
relations recorded in the MiDi database. 24.43 percent of the organizational form choices 
result in a flow-through, underlining the relevance of this organizational form.  
                                                 
3 The investing entity is located either in the same country as the parent of the MNC (direct investment) or in a 
different country (indirect investment). We analyze organizational form choices of the investing entity because 
data on the entire group structure is not available (see Section 3.1).  
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In our first tests, we document that the probability of establishing a new affiliate as a 
flow-through is positively associated with the tax burden difference between organizational 
forms. This effect is economically meaningful and comparable to the effect of non-tax 
determinants: a one standard deviation increase in the tax cost of a subsidiary is associated 
with a 4.1 percentage point higher probability of establishing a flow-through. Thus, MNCs 
are sensitive to international taxation when selecting an organizational form for a newly 
established foreign affiliate. We also exploit a 2008 tax reform in Germany, which reduced 
the withholding tax on dividend distributions to a subset of home countries in our sample. 
Corroborating our baseline results, we find a lower probability of establishing a new affiliate 
as a flow-through for investing entities located in home countries affected by the reform.  
Next, we conduct several cross-sectional tests to identify conditions under which the 
relation between international taxation and organizational form choices of MNCs might vary. 
Specifically, we examine variation in income-shifting opportunities (Klassen and Laplante 
2012) and find that investing entities are less sensitive to the tax burden difference if MNCs 
have greater opportunities to shift taxable income. We also explore variation in non-tax 
factors and find that industry-specific risk and differences in regulatory quality between 
Germany and the home country of the MNC mitigate the tax sensitivity. These results 
indicate that MNCs highly value a subsidiary’s non-tax benefit of limited liability and legal 
independence. In contrast, we find a higher tax sensitivity for investing entities with prior 
host-country experience.  
Finally, we extend our sample to all observations available for a new affiliate in the 
MiDi database and examine consequences of organizational form choices. We find that, 
compared to a subsidiary, a new affiliate established as a flow-through takes on less risk, is 
less profitable, and is associated with a less complex group structure. In addition, if an MNC 
chooses a flow-through because of a tax benefit, the affiliate exhibits lower investment and is 
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associated with a more complex group structure. These results suggest that the chosen 
organizational form has economic consequences for the MNC and the new affiliate.  
Our study offers several insights for policy makers and researchers interested in 
organizational form choices of MNCs and the resulting group structures. First, we provide 
novel evidence for the effect of taxes on organizational form choices and the trade-offs 
MNCs face when making these decisions. Prior research on domestic or standalone firms 
shows that although industry-specific tax incentives affect organizational form choices 
(Petroni and Shackelford 1995, Hodder et al. 2003, Utke 2019), non-tax factors tend to drive 
these decisions on average (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1994, Ayers et al 1996, MacKie-
Mason and Gordon 1997, Goolsbee 2004). Our results, in contrast, indicate that tax burden 
differences between organizational forms are an economically important determinant of the 
organizational form an MNC selects for a foreign affiliate. This result is relevant for policy 
makers as it suggests that organizational form choices of MNCs might respond more 
strongly to tax-law changes than decisions of domestic or standalone firms. Further, our 
cross-sectional tests identify several conditions under which these responses might be 
stronger or weaker.  
Second, we contribute to research on the impact of taxes on group structures of 
MNCs. While prior research finds that international taxation influences locational choices for 
foreign affiliates (Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010, Dyreng et al. 2015), we document that 
international taxation is also associated with the organizational form of these affiliates. This 
finding indicates that besides being important for attracting FDI, host-country tax rules could 
additionally influence the legal form of cross-border investment. This result is also relevant 
for researchers that examine group structures of MNCs since it suggests that limiting the 
analysis to corporate subsidiaries might neglect a significant share of an MNC’s cross-border 
investment and the tax and non-tax deliberations shaping the associated group structures. 
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Third, we add to studies on the consequences of organizational form choices. While 
prior research shows that non-corporate forms lead to lower firm-level growth (Demirguc-
Kunt et al. 2006), our results suggest that selecting a non-corporate flow-through is 
associated with lower risk-taking, lower profitability, and a less complex group structure. In 
addition, exploiting a tax benefit through a flow-through might come at the cost of lower 
investment and a more complex group structure. These findings inform recent tax-policy 
initiatives by shedding light on the consequences of differently taxing organizational forms. 
For instance, in the BEPS Action Plan, the OECD emphasizes withholding taxes to combat 
tax-motivated income shifting (OECD 2013). Implementing such a policy differently across 
organizational forms could impact organizational form choices and affect subsequent 
economic decisions. Finally, our results are useful to financial-statement users by suggesting 
that the organizational form of cross-border investment could signal differences in 
investment or risk-taking within MNCs.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
institutional background, discusses prior research, and derives our hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the MiDi database, our samples, and the research design. Section 4 presents results 
for the determinants of organizational form choices while results for their economic 
consequences are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background, Prior Research, and Hypotheses Development 
International Taxation and Organizational Forms 
We examine investing entities that select an organizational form for a newly 
established foreign affiliate. As outlined in Figure 1, the investing entity could be located 
either in the same country as the parent of the MNC, which leads to direct investment, or in a 
different country, which we classify as indirect investment. We group organizational forms 
available to the investing entity into two categories: (i) subsidiaries and (ii) flow-throughs. 
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Subsidiaries are legally independent corporate forms while flow-throughs denote non-
corporate forms, such as partnerships or branches, that legally belong to the investing entity.4  
Foreign income earned in a subsidiary and in a flow-through is subject to three layers 
of international taxation. These layers include (i) the host country corporate income tax, (ii) 
the dividend-withholding tax levied on a subsidiary’s dividend distributions, and (iii) the 
corporate income tax in the home country of the investing entity (Huizinga et al. 2008, 
Huizinga and Voget 2009, Barrios et al. 2012).  
If subsidiaries and flow-throughs are taxed differently along one of these dimensions, 
the tax burden on foreign income differs between the two organizational forms. Specifically, 
a subsidiary leads to a higher tax burden if the investing entity is located in a home country 
that exempts foreign income from tax (territorial tax system) or in a home country that does 
not relief foreign income from double taxation. This is due to the dividend-withholding tax, 
which is not offset by a tax credit in the home country. If the investing entity is located in a 
home country that taxes foreign income while granting a tax credit for foreign taxes paid 
(worldwide tax system), the extent to which a subsidiary might lead to a higher tax burden 
depends on host and home country corporate income tax rates and the tax credit granted. The 
dividend-withholding tax is again the main driver of any tax burden difference.5  
For each home-country-year, we calculate the tax burden difference between 
organizational forms and derive the tax cost of a subsidiary. We take statutory corporate 
income tax rates, dividend-withholding tax rates, the home country tax system, and double 
tax treaties into account. We provide more details on this approach in Appendix B. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
                                                 
4 In Appendix C, we provide further background on the organizational forms available to an MNC in Germany.  
5 The tax cost of a subsidiary could be negative if the investing entity is located in a home country that operates a 
worldwide tax system for flow-throughs and a territorial system for subsidiaries. Most home countries in our 
sample operate the same tax system for both organizational forms. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929347 
8 
Prior Research 
Determinants and Consequences of Organizational Form Choices 
Prior research on determinants of organizational form choices has mainly examined 
domestic settings and documents economically small effects of taxes on these decisions. 
Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994), for instance, use macro-level data and find that the non-
tax costs associated with non-corporate forms, such as the lack of capital-market access and 
unlimited liability, facilitate incorporation in the trade, service, and manufacturing sector. 
MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997) show that differences in the taxation of organizational 
forms affect the allocation of assets and taxable income between the corporate and non-
corporate sector. However, the authors conclude that non-tax determinants tend to dominate 
the organizational form choices in their sample.  
Firm-level analyses of small businesses provide more nuanced results. Ayers et al. 
(1996) show that non-tax determinants, such as business risk and financing requirements, 
dominate organizational form choices of small firms. Taxes, in contrast, affect the choice 
between organizational forms with similar non-tax costs and benefits, such as S and C 
corporations. In analyzing 1992 census data from the retail sector, Goolsbee (2004) finds a 
relatively large tax effect, which is driven by low non-tax costs of operating through a non-
corporate form in this sector. For closely-held firms, Romanov (2006) and Edmark and 
Gordon (2013) show that high personal income tax rates provide an incentive for high-income 
individuals to shift income into corporate forms. 
Evidence for taxes as a determinant of organizational form choices for large firms or 
MNCs is rare because the non-tax costs of operating through a non-corporate form (e.g., the 
lack of capital-market access) seem prohibitively high for these firms (Ayers et al. 1996). The 
effect of taxes is limited to specific incentives that outweigh non-tax costs in narrow settings. 
For instance, Hodder et al. (2003) show that the opportunity to avoid dividend taxes and 
alternative minimum taxes increases a bank’s probability of converting from a taxable C-
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corporation to a non-taxable S-corporation. Similarly, simulation results in Goolsbee and 
Maydew (2002) suggest that real estate investment trusts (REITs), which avoid dividend taxes 
on real estate income, offer tax savings that are concentrated in a small number of industries.  
While prior research has frequently studied the determinants of organizational form 
choices, evidence for the consequences of these decisions is limited. In a cross-country study, 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) find similar firm-level growth for corporate and non-corporate 
forms. However, in countries with high-quality financial and legal institutions, corporate 
forms grow faster due to capital-market access and lower financing frictions. The tax benefits 
associated with an organizational form could also influence subsequent economic decisions. 
Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry (2018) study the choice of U.S. banks to convert from a 
C-corporation to a tax-favored S-corporation. To improve their competitive position, banks 
invest tax savings into advertising spending and higher deposit rates. Utke (2019) examines 
equity carve-outs into Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) and finds that tax-sensitive 
shareholders increase their ownership stake in the more lightly taxed MLP, whereas tax-
exempt shareholders invest more heavily in the tax-disadvantaged parent firm.  
Taxes and Group Structures of MNCs  
Cross-border economic activities of MNCs involve group structures with affiliates in 
several countries (ICIJ 2014). Prior research suggests that taxes might shape specific elements 
of these structures. Dyreng et al. (2015), for instance, examine locational choices for U.S.-
owned foreign subsidiaries and find that MNCs strategically select a host country to minimize 
the withholding tax on dividend distributions. Similarly, Lewellen and Robinson (2013) 
examine internal ownership chains of U.S. MNCs and show that several tax factors, such as 
double tax treaties, controlled-foreign corporation rules, and capital gains taxes, determine the 
location of a subsidiary and the choice between direct and indirect ownership chains. In a 
purely domestic setting, Petroni and Shackelford (1995) show that multi-state U.S. insurers 
choose between a subsidiary and a licensing agreement for their cross-state expansion in order 
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to jointly optimize state taxes and regulatory costs. Buettner, Riedel, and Runkel (2011) study 
the local business tax in Germany and find that income-shifting opportunities incentivize 
multi-jurisdictional firms to retain separate taxation of their subsidiaries rather than opting for 
tax consolidation. In a European setting, Oestreicher and Koch (2012) find that the dividend-
withholding tax reduces the likelihood of establishing vertical group structures.  
Hypotheses Development 
When establishing a new affiliate, the investing entity selects the organizational form 
with the best cost-benefit relation (MacKie-Mason and Gordon 1997, Goolsbee 1998, 2004, 
Luna and Murray 2010). In a cross-border setting, the dividend-withholding tax only applies 
to dividend distributions of a subsidiary while a flow-through is not subject to this tax. Thus, 
the dividend-withholding is the main tax cost (benefit) of a subsidiary (flow-through).6 In 
addition, if the investing entity is located in a country with a worldwide tax system, an MNC 
might offset tax losses incurred in a foreign flow-through with taxable income of the investing 
entity. Such a cross-border loss offset is typically not available for foreign subsidiaries.7 
Compared to a standalone or domestic firm, an MNC might weigh non-tax costs and 
benefits of organizational forms differently. For a standalone firm, preventing access to the 
capital market is a major non-tax cost associated with a flow-through (Ayers et al. 1996). This 
factor is less relevant for an MNC because it could raise capital globally and finance foreign 
affiliates through the internal capital market (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2004). In contrast, 
differences in the liability exposure of the investing entity are relevant in a cross-border 
context because claims from creditors, employees, and customers against the new affiliate can 
expose the investing entity and the MNC to risk. A subsidiary offers the non-tax benefit of 
                                                 
6 The statutory dividend-withholding tax is an upper bound for the tax cost of a subsidiary as is might be reduced 
by a tax credit under a worldwide tax system or by the deferral of the repatriation of foreign income (Foley, 
Hartzell, Titman, and Twite 2007, Blouin and Krull 2009).  
7 Only a limited number of countries (e.g., Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, etc.) offer a cross-border loss offset 
for subsidiaries.  
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limited liability that protects the MNC against claims (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1994), 
which limits the loss potential to the equity stake in the affiliate (Ayers et al. 1996).8  
Aside from limited liability, several other non-tax determinants might affect 
organizational form choices in a cross-border setting. For instance, the transfer of ownership 
in a subsidiary is less costly as its shares can be easily transferred. Transferring ownership in a 
flow-through, in contrast, requires a transfer of assets or the re-negotiation of the partnership 
agreement (Ayers et al. 1996). Conversely, a subsidiary implies higher compliance costs due 
to stricter regulatory and financial reporting requirements and higher coordination costs due to 
the separation of ownership and control (Goolsbee and Maydew 2002).  
When establishing a new affiliate, the investing entity determines these tax and non-
tax costs and benefits and selects the organizational form with the best cost-benefit relation 
(Luna and Murray 2010). As a higher tax cost of selecting a subsidiary raises the tax benefit 
of a flow-through, we expect the probability of establishing a flow-through to increase 
accordingly. Based on these arguments, we formulate the following baseline hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  The tax cost of a subsidiary is positively associated with the probability of 
establishing a flow-through.  
The relation under H1 assumes that an MNC repatriates foreign income via dividend 
distributions that are subject to international taxation. An MNC, however, might limit the 
extent to which income is exposed to international taxation and therefore mitigate the tax cost 
of a subsidiary by shifting income to a low-tax country (Hines and Rice 1994, Dyreng and 
Markle 2016).9 Since income shifting reduces the tax cost of a subsidiary, we expect an MNC 
with income-shifting opportunities to be less sensitive to tax burden differences between 
organizational forms. These arguments suggest the following cross-sectional hypothesis: 
                                                 
8 For instance, an MNC requires EUR 25,000 to establish a GmbH in Germany. Thus, in the absence of intra-firm 
comfort letters, the potential loss of the investing entity is limited to this amount.  
9 Common strategies exploit discretion in setting intra-firm transfer prices (Klassen and Laplante 2012), cost-
sharing arrangements (De Simone and Sansing 2019), and tax-deductible intra-firm interest or royalty payments. 
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Hypothesis 2: The association between the tax cost of a subsidiary and the probability of 
establishing a flow-through is weaker for MNCs with income-shifting 
opportunities. 
With respect to non-tax determinants, the risk profile of the industry in which the new 
affiliate operates can alter the cost-benefit relation of organizational forms. Capital-intensive 
industries, such as manufacturing or wholesale, involve high industry-specific risk that raises 
the likelihood of losses for the investing entity and the MNC. As the non-tax benefit of 
limited liability is valuable in these industries (Liu 2014), we expect the tax burden difference 
to be a less important. Thus, we formulate the following cross-sectional hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: The association between the tax cost of a subsidiary and the probability of 
establishing a flow-through is weaker for new affiliates subject to high 
industry-specific risk. 
An MNC that engages in FDI is subject to several sets of regulation. Low regulatory 
quality in the parent home country, such the inability of the government to implement and 
maintain stable regulation, could pose significant risk to cross-border investments (Dikova, 
Sahib, and van Witteloostuijn 2010). While establishing a legally independent subsidiary 
prevents risk associated with low regulatory quality from spilling over to the new affiliate, a 
flow-through legally belongs to the investing entity and low regulatory quality could directly 
impact the new affiliate and its business. As a subsidiary shields cross-border investment from 
risk associated with low regulatory quality, we expect the investing entity to be less sensitive 
to the tax burden difference. This leads to the following cross-sectional hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3b: The association between the tax cost of a subsidiary and the probability of 
establishing a flow-through is weaker for MNCs located in countries with 
low regulatory quality. 
Establishing a new affiliate can coincide with a market entry in the host country. An 
MNC that enters a foreign market for the first time has to collect information about tax-
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efficient group structures (Feller and Schanz 2017), evaluate local market conditions, and take 
strategic decisions, such as how to finance the market entry or how much to invest in the host 
country. In contrast, an MNC with prior experience in the host country may be able to devote 
greater effort in establishing tax-efficient group structures. Thus, we expect an investing 
entity with prior host-country experience to be more sensitive to the tax burden difference. 
Based on these arguments, we state the following cross-sectional hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3c: The association between the tax cost of a subsidiary and the probability of 
establishing a flow-through is stronger for MNCs with prior host-country 
experience. 
Since a subsidiary and a flow-through differ along several dimensions, the chosen 
organizational form could have economic consequences for the new affiliate (Demirguc-Kunt 
et al. 2006). For instance, greater liability exposure associated with a flow-through might 
reduce an MNCs propensity to take on risk (John, Litov, and Yeung 2008, Acharya, Amihud, 
and Litov 2011) and alter the investment behavior of the new affiliate (Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen 2006). As the non-tax costs of unlimited liability increase with the size of the new 
affiliate, the MNC has weaker incentives to undertake large and risky investments. At the 
same time, a low-risk investment strategy is likely to result in lower profitability and requires 
a less complex group structure in the FDI host country. Based on these arguments, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Establishing a foreign affiliate as a flow-through is negatively associated 
with i) risk-taking, ii) investment, iii) profitability, and iv) the complexity of 
the group structure in the FDI host country.  
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3 Data and Research Design 
MiDi Database and Supplementary Data Sources  
We use the MiDi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank as our primary data source.10 
The MiDi database is a below firm-level dataset that provides anonymized micro-level data on 
the stock of in- and outbound FDI relations in Germany starting in the year 1999.11 According 
to the German Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung), an 
inbound FDI relation has to be reported to the Deutsche Bundesbank if an investing entity 
holds at least 10 percent of the shares or voting rights of a subsidiary or a partnership located 
in Germany with a balance sheet total of more than EUR 3 million. A German branch or a 
permanent establishment held by an investing entity also has to be reported if the business 
assets amount to EUR 3 million and more (Lipponer 2011, Schild and Walter 2017).  
Data for the German affiliate includes an identifier, industry affiliation, annual balance 
sheet positions, and annual turnover, after-tax profit, and the number of employees.12 The key 
advantage of the MiDi database is that we can identify the organizational form of the affiliate. 
This information is either limited or unavailable in conventional data sources, such as Orbis or 
Compustat. Being an FDI database, the dataset also provides the percentage of shares held by 
the investing entity and the share of asset and liability positions of the affiliate attributable to 
the investing entity or other affiliates of the MNC. This includes information on intra-firm 
debt provided to the affiliate. The main drawbacks of the MiDi database are the lack of 
income statement information and that data on the investing entity and the parent is limited to 
an identifier for the investing entity and the respective home countries. We are thus unable to 
conduct in-depth analysis on the parent and affiliates outside of Germany.  
                                                 
10 DOI: 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9913.01.01. 
11 Penalties and data appraisal techniques ensure high data quality (Lipponer 2011, Schild and Walter 2017) 
12 Aside from a numeric identifier, the MiDi Database does not include any identifying information for the German 
affiliate. The firm name of the affiliate is not recorded in the database.  
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Although the MiDi database limits our analysis to Germany, several arguments 
suggest that Germany is a powerful setting to examine organizational form choices of MNCs. 
First, Germany has an extensive double tax treaty network that provides variation in the tax 
burden difference between organizational forms based on the home country of the investing 
entity. Since all organizational form choices in our sample are subject to the identical host 
country regulation, we exploit variation in tax costs and benefits while keeping non-tax 
characteristics of organizational forms constant. Second, since most existing tax systems are 
based on common principles, the tax effects of international taxation apply to a large number 
of country combinations (Huizinga et al. 2008, Huizinga and Voget 2009, Barrios et al. 2012). 
Third, Germany is a G7 country where MNCs tend to invest for economic reasons, leading to 
a long-term presence in the host country. Fourth, in contrast to studies using domestic settings 
(e.g., Petroni and Shackelford 1995), our cross-border approach allows us to test whether 
country-level differences moderate the effect of taxes on organizational form choices.  
We supplement data from the MiDi database with dividend-withholding tax rates, 
home and host country corporate income tax rates, and information on the home country tax 
system. We collect this data from corporate tax guides (e.g., Ernst & Young 2005-2013). Data 
for control variables stems from several sources, including the World Bank’s regulatory 
quality indicators database (World Bank 2005-2013) and Thomson Reuter’s Datastream.  
Sample Selection 
Sample I: Organizational Form Choice Sample 
To obtain a sample of organizational form choices, we identify the first observation of 
an inbound FDI relation in Germany between 1999 and 2013 (18,265 observations). First, we 
drop observations prior to the year 2005 as information to differentiate newly established 
from pre-existing affiliates is unavailable prior to 2005 (12,206 observations). Second, we 
drop observations where the investing entity holds less than 25 percent of the shares of the 
new affiliate (360 observations). Strategic decisions under German corporate law require the 
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(1) 
consent of more than 75 percent of the shareholders. The 25 percent threshold ensures that the 
investing entity may influence the organizational form choice for the new affiliate.13 Third, 
we drop observations without sufficient tax information (19 observations). Lastly, we exclude 
observations of pre-existing affiliates where the first observation in the database results from 
overshooting the reporting threshold (3,498 observations). For the years 2005 to 2013, these 
restrictions yield 2,182 organizational form choices. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Sample II: Economic Consequences Sample  
To study the economic consequences of organizational form choices, we extend our 
organizational form choice sample to any observation available for a new affiliate in the MiDi 
database. Starting with the year of the organizational form choice, we obtain 6,798 affiliate-
year observations for the years 2005 to 2013. The sample size varies across our empirical tests 
because some of the regression variables require several years of prior data.  
Research Design 
Determinants of Organizational Form Choices 
To model organizational form choices and to test H1, we estimate the following 
logistic regression model:  
Pr⁡(𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑿 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡ + 𝜀. 
Pr⁡(𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑖)  is the probability that an investing entity establishes new 
affiliate i as a flow-through. Unless indicated otherwise, we measure variables in the year of 
the organizational form choice. Flow-Through is an indicator variable with the value of one if 
affiliate i is established as a flow-through and zero if established as a subsidiary. Taxwedge is 
our main variable of interest and captures the tax burden difference between organizational 
                                                 
13 Our inferences are unchanged when applying alternative thresholds, such as 50, 75, or 100 percent. If the new 
affiliate is held by multiple investing entities, we keep the observation for the main investor. 
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forms. We expect a positive coefficient for 𝛽1, consistent with the probability of establishing 
affiliate i as a flow-through being positively associated with the tax cost of a subsidiary.   
Vector X includes control variables for determinants of organizational form choices. 
First, we control for characteristics of affiliate i and include LN(Employ) as the logarithm of 
employees and LN(Assets) as the logarithm of total assets to proxy for affiliate size. The non-
tax benefit of limited liability increases in affiliate size (Liu 2014). We add LossYear as an 
indicator variable with the value of one if affiliate i reports a loss.14 Losses serve as a risk 
indicator and increase the non-tax benefit of limited liability (Ayers et al. 1996). LossYear 
also captures potential tax benefits of a cross-border loss offset through a flow-through.  
Next, since organizational forms differ in financial-reporting requirements, we include 
Leverage to control for debtholder demand for financial statement information (Armstrong, 
Guay, and Weber 2010). Further, we include Roa as net profit over total assets to control for 
profitability. We add Brownfield as an indicator variable with the value of one if affiliate i is 
established through a merger and acquisition (M&A) and zero if it is established from scratch 
(greenfield investment). M&A is more likely to involve a subsidiary because shares in a 
subsidiary are less costly to transfer. We also include Distribution as an indicator variable 
with the value of one if affiliate i distributes foreign profit in year t+1, InternDebt as the ratio 
of intra-firm debt to total assets and Intangibles as an indicator variable with the value of one 
if affiliate i is established in an intangible-asset intensive industry (Hall, Helmers, Rogers, and 
Sena 2014). These variables control for immediate profit distributions and income-shifting 
opportunities, which alter the tax costs and benefits of organizational forms.  
Second, we control for characteristics of the investing entity. We add NumInv as the 
number of inbound FDI relations of the investing entity in Germany. A higher number of FDI 
                                                 
14 Inferences are unchanged when extending LossYear to two or three years of consecutive losses (untabulated). 
Aside from a risk aspect, LossYear might also capture differences in profitability and the likelihood of distributing 
foreign income. To capture these dimensions, we include Roa and Distribution as separate control variables.  
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relations implies host-country experience and indicates that risk is spread across several 
affiliates, lowering the non-tax benefit of limited liability. To capture cooperation among 
investors, we control for the percentage of shares held by the investing entity in affiliate i 
(Holdings). Cooperation requires commitment, for instance through unlimited liability, which 
suggests a negative association between Holdings and the probability of establishing a flow-
through. We add DirectFDI as an indicator variable with the value of one if the investing 
entity engages in direct investment, and zero for indirect investment. An MNC engages in 
indirect investment to exploit double tax treaties (Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010, Wamser 
2011) or to benefit from regulatory differences between countries (Cerutti et al. 2007). The 
first strategy requires a subsidiary to obtain tax treaty entitlement, while the second strategy is 
based on a flow-through that operates via licenses granted to other affiliates.  
Third, we control for characteristics of the parent home country. We include LN(Dist) 
as the distance between Germany and the parent home country to capture coordination costs 
and cross-border frictions. While a flow-through implies low coordination costs (Goolsbee 
and Maydew 2002), distance leads to cross-border frictions, increasing a subsidiary’s non-tax 
benefit of legal independence. We add DiffRegQuality to control for country-level differences 
in regulatory quality. We use World Bank’s regulatory quality indicators, which measure the 
ability of the government to implement sound regulation (World Bank 2005-2013). A legally 
independent subsidiary shields FDI from risk associated with low regulatory quality in the 
parent home country. To control for institutional differences, we follow LaPorta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2008) and include indicator variables for the origin of the home 
country legal system (LegorUK, LegorFR, LegorSC). We add Year and Industry fixed effects 
to capture year shocks and time-invariant industry characteristics. We cluster standard errors 
at the investing-entity level to account for serial correlation (Petersen 2009).15  
                                                 
15 Our main inferences are unchanged when using alternative clusters (e.g., industry, year, the home country of the 
investing entity, or the parent home country). 
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(2) 
To formally test our cross-sectional hypotheses, we include variables in Equation (1) 
that partition our sample into subsamples in which we expect the association between 
Taxwedge and Flow-Through to differ. We explain these tests in more detail below.  
Economic Consequences of Organizational Form Choices 
To examine economic consequences of organizational form choices and to test H4, we 
estimate the following OLS regression: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝑿 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡ + 𝜀.  
Depvar is a set of dependent variables, which includes RiskTaking, Investment, Roa, 
and Complexity, all measured in year t. We follow Langenmayr and Lester (2018) and 
compute RiskTaking as the industry-year adjusted standard deviation of affiliate i’s return on 
assets (Roa) over the three-year period t to t+2. Investment, our proxy for annual investment 
of affiliate i, is calculated as the change in fixed and intangible assets from year t-1 to t and 
divided by lagged total assets. Roa is net profit over total assets and captures the profitability 
of affiliate i. Complexity, our proxy for the complexity of the group structure in the FDI host 
country, is the natural logarithm of the number of affiliates held by affiliate i in Germany.  
In line with Equation (1), Flow-Through, our main variable of interest, is an indicator 
variable with the value of one (zero) if affiliate i was established a flow-through (subsidiary). 
We expect negative coefficients for Flow-Through in all tests, consistent with establishing 
affiliate i as a flow-through being negatively associated with risk-taking, investment, 
profitability, and the complexity of the group structure.  
We follow prior research on risk-taking and investment (Cummins, Hassett, and 
Hubbard 1996, Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 2003, Langenmayr and Lester 2018) and include a 
set of control variables (Vector X). To control for differences in size, the presence of losses, 
and the availability of internal funds, we add LN(Employ), LN(Assets), LossYear, Leverage, 
and Roa from Equation (1). To control for investment opportunities, we include PE-Ratio as 
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the mean price-to-earnings (PE) ratio of publicly listed firms operating in the same industry as 
affiliate i.16 In addition, we add LN(Sales) as the natural logarithm of sales, Investment as the 
annual change in fixed and intangible assets over lagged total assets, Cash as cash over total 
assets, and Age as year t less the year affiliate i was established. We lag LN(Employ), 
LN(Assets), Leverage, Roa, LN(Sales), Investment, and Cash by one year as the value of these 
variables in year t-1 is likely to be associated with Depvar in year t. We include year and 
industry-fixed effects and again cluster standard errors at the investing-entity level. 
4 Results for Determinants of Organizational Form Choices 
Descriptive Statistics 
Investing entities in our sample are located in 59 home countries, which account for 
more than 99 percent of all inbound FDI relations recorded in the MiDi database. For each 
home-country-year, we compute the tax cost of a subsidiary (see Appendix B). Table 2, Panel 
A suggests that Taxwedge varies across home countries.17 Taxwedge is zero for most EU 
countries because the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive abolished the withholding tax on dividend 
distributions within the EU. In contrast, Taxwedge is high for tax havens, such as the British 
Virgin Islands or Jersey, because Germany has not signed double tax treaties with these 
countries. Thus, the dividend-withholding becomes a final burden on a subsidiary’s dividend 
distributions. Taxwedge also varies over time. In total, we record 83 changes in Taxwedge (45 
increases and 38 decreases). 62 changes occur around a 2008 tax reform in Germany, which 
reduced the corporate income tax rate and the dividend-withholding tax rate. The remaining 
changes spread across our sample period and stem from changes in home country corporate 
income tax rates, home country tax systems, or dividend-withholding tax rates.  
                                                 
16 We obtain monthly PE-ratios for publicly listed firms in Germany from Datastream. We calculate annual 
industry-level PE-ratios based on one digit ICB-codes by taking the median. For further details and recent two 
applications of this measure, see Shroff, Verdi, and Yu (2014) and Amberger, Markle, and Samuel (2019).  
17 In line with Deutsche Bundesbank’s confidentiality rules, we present home countries with a minimum of three 
observations per organizational form that result from three distinct investing entities. Our sample includes another 
32 home countries that do not fulfill this confidentiality requirement. 
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Organizational form choices in our sample include 1,649 subsidiaries and 533 flow-
throughs. The unconditional probability of establishing a flow-through is 24.43 percent 
(533/2,182). We observe the highest number of new affiliates for investing entities from 
neighboring countries (e.g., Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria) and 
from major economies (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom). Consistent with 
variation in Taxwedge, we observe differences in the relative importance of organizational 
forms. Despite a Taxwedge of zero, investing entities from neighboring countries establish 
flow-throughs. This is the result of low geographical distance diminishing coordination costs 
and similarities in legal systems reducing risk associated with unlimited liability. Both aspects 
reduce the non-tax costs of a flow-through and increase its relative attractiveness. 
Panel B presents organizational form choices by sample year. The number of new 
affiliates increases in sample years 2005-2007 and again after the year 2010. The number of 
new affiliates decreases between 2008 and 2010, which is likely the result of the global 
financial crisis. The relative importance of flow-throughs varies over time and increases in 
sample years 2007-2009 and again in the years 2011-2013. Panel C presents organizational 
form choices by industry.18 We observe the highest number of new affiliates in the financial 
services industry, and the lowest in the transportation industry. The relative importance of 
flow-throughs is highest in the energy supply and construction industries, and lowest in the 
wholesale, information and communication, and manufacturing industries. These differences 
suggest that industry characteristics affect organizational form choices.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the full sample and separately for subsidiaries 
and flow-throughs. We conduct t-tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) to assess differences in 
means (medians) between subsamples. The mean of Taxwedge is significantly larger for flow-
                                                 
18 We aggregate observations based on one-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes to ensure a meaningful analysis.  
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throughs (t-statistic -2.86), consistent with investing entities being sensitive to tax burden 
differences in organizational form choices. The difference in medians is insignificant (z-
statistic -0.64) because 80.9 percent of the new affiliates report a Taxwedge of zero.19 The 
differences in means and medians for remaining variables are in line with our expectations.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 4 presents Pearson coefficients for univariate correlations between our 
dependent and independent variables. In line with the descriptive statistics, the correlation 
between Taxwedge and Flow-Through is positive and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, the tax cost 
of a subsidiary is positively associated with the probability of establishing a flow-through, 
which is consistent with H1. Correlations between the remaining variables are generally 
consistent with the descriptive statistics. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Tests of H1: Tax Burden Difference and Organizational Form Choices 
To test H1, we estimate Equation (1) on the organizational form choice sample and 
present results in Table 5.20 In column 1, we exclude year and industry-fixed effects while we 
estimate the full model in column 3. As predicted, coefficients on Taxwedge are positive and 
significant in both columns (p < 0.01). This result suggests that the probability of establishing 
a flow-through is positively associated with the tax cost of a subsidiary. Results for control 
variables are generally as expected.21 For instance, the probability of establishing a flow-
through is negatively associated with affiliate size (LN(Employ) and losses (LossYear) and 
                                                 
19 The share of observations with a Taxwedge of zero implies a similar central tendency of Taxwedge in both 
subsamples, which renders the difference in medians insignificant. In Table 9, we drop observations with a 
Taxwedge of zero and obtain results consistent with our baseline findings. We keep these observations in our 
primary sample because they provide information on non-tax determinants of organizational form choices.  
20 To facilitate a meaningful interpretation, we standardize independent variables to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. 
21 Given the extensive set of control variables, we calculate variance inflation factor scores (VIFs). For the model 
in column 3, the maximum VIF for our independent variables is 2.61 (Intangibles). Among year and industry-
fixed effects, the maximum VIF is 3.62 (“Manufacturing” industry), which alleviates multicollinearity concerns.  
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positively associated with profit distributions (Distribution) and the number of FDI relations 
held by the investing entity (NumInv).   
The area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve suggests that our 
regression models exhibit reasonable predictive power (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 
2013). For instance, the regression in column 3 predicts the correct organizational form for 
78.9 percent of the observations our sample. Comparing the area under the ROC curve for the 
regressions in columns 1 and 3, we note that year and industry-fixed effects significantly 
increase the predictive power of the regression model (χ² = 42.82, p < 0.01). This indicates 
that the tax and non-tax determinants captured in our regression model as well as year and 
industry characteristics explain organizational form choices in our sample.  
To gauge the economic significance of our results, we report marginal effects for the 
independent variables. In column 4, a one standard deviation increase in Taxwedge (i.e. by 
3.48 percentage points) is associated with a 4.1 percentage point higher probability of 
establishing a flow-through. In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in Leverage 
(Roa) is associated with a 3.7 (7.7) percentage point lower probability of establishing a flow-
through.22 In addition, a likelihood ratio test suggests that adding Taxwedge as an independent 
variable significantly improves the fit of our regression model (χ² = 18.20, p < 0.01).  
Taken together, these results support H1: The probability of establishing a flow-
through is positively associated with the tax cost of a subsidiary. The tax burden difference 
between organizational forms is an economically important determinant of the organizational 
form an MNC selects for a new affiliate. In fact, the marginal effect of Taxwedge is similar to 
continuous non-tax determinants. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
                                                 
22 When calculating marginal effects for year and industry-fixed effects (untabulated), we find that the marginal 
effect of a specific industry (except for the industry “Energy Supply”) or a specific year is similar to the marginal 
effect of categorical non-tax determinants (e.g., LossYear, Brownfield, DirectFDI). Thus, the variables in our 
regression model capture economically important determinants of organizational form choices. 
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Tests of H2: Income-Shifting Opportunities  
H2 predicts that the tax burden difference is less relevant for organizational form 
choices of MNCs with income-shifting opportunities. To test this, we modify Equation (1) 
and present results in Table 6. In column 1, we interact Taxwedge with HighIntDebt, which is 
an indicator variable with the value of one if intra-firm debt provided to the new affiliate by 
foreign affiliates is above the sample median. Intra-firm interest payments allow an MNC to 
repatriate foreign income without triggering the dividend-withholding tax and we expect a 
lower tax sensitivity for a new affiliate with high intra-firm debt. Consistent with this 
expectation, the coefficient on Taxwedge#HighIntDebt is negative and significant (p < 0.01). 
An F-test suggests that the joint effect of Taxwedge and HighIntDebt on Flow-Through 
(β1+β3) is indistinguishable from zero (p = 0.36). In column 2, we interact Taxwedge with 
Intangibles to proxy for income shifting via intra-firm royalty payments on intangible assets. 
In line with the previous test, we expect and find a negative and significant coefficient on 
Taxwedge#Intangibles (column 3, p = 0.07). An F-test suggests that the joint effect of 
Taxwedge and Intangibles (β1+β5) is again indistinguishable from zero (p = 0.25).  
Taken together, these results support H2: The tax cost of a subsidiary is less important 
for organizational form choices of MNCs with income-shifting opportunities. Repatriation 
strategies that reduce the extent to which income is e 
xposed to international taxation moderate the tax sensitivity of investing entities and 
dampen the effect tax burden differences between subsidiaries and flow-throughs on 
organizational form choices.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Tests of H3a, H3b, and H3c: Non-Tax Factors  
H3a-c predict that non-tax factors moderate the tax sensitivity of investing entities. To 
test this, we modify Equation (1) and present results in Table 7. In column 1, we test H3a and 
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interact Taxwedge with HighIndRisk, which is an indicator variable with the value of one if 
the new affiliate is established in the manufacturing or wholesale industry. As a subsidiary’s 
non-tax benefit of limited liability is valuable in these capital-intensive industries, we expect 
Taxwedge to be less relevant. Supporting this prediction, the coefficient on 
Taxwedge#HighIndRisk is negative and significant (p = 0.09).23 An F-test indicates that the 
joint effect of Taxwedge and HighIndRisk (β1+β3) is indistinguishable from zero (p = 0.35). 
These results suggest that the tax burden difference is less relevant for organizational form 
choices in industries with high industry-specific risk. 
In column 3, we test H3b and interact Taxwedge with HighRegDiff, which is an 
indicator variable with the value of one if the difference in regulatory quality between 
Germany and the parent home country is above the sample median. A legally independent 
subsidiary shields cross-border investment from risk associated with low regulatory quality in 
the parent home country and we expect the tax cost of a subsidiary to becomes less relevant in 
an organizational form choice. Consistent with this prediction, we find a negative and 
significant coefficient on Taxwedge#HighRegDiff (p = 0.06). An F-test suggests that the joint 
effect of Taxwedge and HighRegDiff (β1+β5) is different from zero (p = 0.04). This suggests 
that low regulatory quality in the parent home county reduces the relevance of Taxwedge.  
In column 5, we test H3c and interact Taxwedge with HighExp, which is an indicator 
variable with the value of one if the investing entity reports at least one additional inbound 
FDI relation in Germany at the time it establishes the new affiliate. An MNC with prior host-
country experience has greater knowledge of tax-efficient group structures and is more 
familiar with local market conditions, increasing the importance of tax costs and benefits of 
                                                 
23 Depreciation is an alternative explanation for this result. The investing entity might be less sensitive to Taxwedge 
if depreciation diminishes the taxable income of the new affiliate. To examine this, we interact Taxwedge with an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if the ratio of fixed and intangible assets to total assets of the new affiliate 
is above the sample median. Supporting an explanation based on industry-specific risk, we find a positive and 
significant coefficient on the interaction (p < 0.01). This result is also in line with fewer income-shifting 
opportunities and mirrors our findings for intangible-asset intensive industries in Table 6.  
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organizational forms. In line with this expectation, the coefficient on Taxwedge#HighExp is 
positive and significant (p < 0.01).24 These results suggest that host-country experience 
increases the relevance of Taxwedge as a determinant of organizational form choices.  
Taken together, these results support H3a to H3c: Non-tax factors moderate the 
relation between the tax burden difference and organizational form choices. Results for 
industry-specific risk and differences in regulatory quality suggest that MNCs highly value 
non-tax benefits of limited liability and legal independence associated. Thus, in settings where 
these non-tax benefits are important, MNCs might weakly respond to tax-law changes in their 
organizational form choices.  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Difference-in-Differences Analysis: 2008 Tax Reform in Germany  
To rule out that correlated omitted variables might drive our results, we examine a 
2008 tax reform in Germany that provided a plausibly exogenous shock to the tax cost of a 
subsidiary. The reform was enacted in August 2007 and implemented in two steps. First and 
effective from January 1, 2008, the corporate income tax rate, including the local business tax, 
was reduced by 9 percentage points (OECD 2019). In a second step, the dividend-withholding 
tax was reduced by 10.6 percentage points, effective from January 1, 2009. While the lower 
corporate income tax rate led to an increase in Taxwedge, this effect was more than offset by 
the reduction in the dividend-withholding tax. For investing entities from countries affected 
by the reform, these changes led to a net decrease in Taxwedge. In contrast, the reform did not 
change the tax cost of a subsidiary for countries with a Taxwedge of zero prior to the reform.  
We exploit these features in a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design. To this 
end, we add Reform and Post to Equation (1). Reform is an indicator variable with the value 
of one if the investing entity is located in a country for which Taxwedge changed through the 
                                                 
24 An F-test suggests that the joint effect of Taxwedge and HighExp (β1+β7) is larger than zero (p < 0.01). 
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reform (treatment observations), and zero if Taxwedge equals zero in the entire sample period 
(control observations). Post is an indicator variable with the value of one for organizational 
form choices after the reform (i.e. 2008 or later). We interact Reform with Post to assess 
whether the reform altered the probability of establishing a flow-through for treatment 
observations relative to investing entities located in countries that were not affected by the 
reform. Since the reform lead to a decrease in Taxwedge, we expect a negative coefficient on 
Reform#Post, consistent with a lower probability of establishing a flow-through after the 
reform. We present this analysis as supplementary because every new affiliate contributes 
only one observation to our sample. Thus, rather than tracking affiliates over time, we test 
whether the reform altered the probability of establishing a new affiliate as a flow-through. 
We present results in Table 8. In column 1, coefficients on Reform and Post are 
positive and significant (all p < 0.01). These results suggest that the probability of establishing 
a flow-through is generally higher for investing entities located in countries affected by the 
reform and for observations in the post-reform period. Importantly, we find a negative and 
significant coefficient on Reform#Post (p = 0.06). This result indicates that, relative to the 
control observations, the probability of establishing a flow-through in the post-reform period 
is lower for investing entities located in a country affected by the reform.  
In column 2, we replace Post with year indicators to assess whether treatment and 
control observations exhibit similar pre-reform trends in the probability of establishing a 
flow-through. Using 2007 as a reference year, we find insignificant coefficients on 
Reform#Year2005 and Reform#Year2006 (all p < 0.26). These results indicate that the 
probability of establishing a flow-through does not differ between treatment and control 
observations prior to the reform, providing support for parallel pre-reform trends. Coefficients 
on the remaining interactions are negative and significant starting in 2010. Thus, the tax 
reform affected organizational form choices from 2010 onwards, which seems reasonable 
given the staggered implementation of the reform.  
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Overall, the results in this section suggest that a reduction in Taxwedge lowered the 
probability of establishing a new affiliate as a flow-through. We therefore conclude that the 
tax cost of a subsidiary has a likely causal effect on organizational form choices of MNCs.  
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
Robustness Tests  
To provide additional evidence for the robustness of our findings, we conduct a battery 
of sensitivity tests and report results in Table 9. First, we re-estimate Equation (1) with annual 
changes in Taxwedge. Specifically, we apply ΔTaxwedge, which is Taxwedge in year t+1 less 
Taxwedge in year t. In column 1, the coefficient on ΔTaxwedge is positive and significant 
(p = 0.07). In line with the results in the previous section, this test further alleviates concerns 
that omitted variables might drive our baseline findings.  
To assess whether large MNCs and their investing entities drive our results, we drop 
observations of investing entities that establish more than one affiliate in our sample. 
Although reducing the sample to 1,655 observations, the coefficient on Taxwedge in column 2 
remains positive and significant (p = 0.01). The marginal effect of Taxwedge is similar to the 
baseline estimate in column 4 of Table 5. Thus, large MNCs and investing entities with one 
affiliate exhibit a similar sensitivity to tax burden differences in organizational form choices.  
Next, we drop observations with a Taxwedge of zero (column 3) and observations of 
investing entities located in a tax haven (column 4).25 Corroborating our baseline results, 
coefficients on Taxwedge are positive and significant in both columns (p = 0.05). The 
marginal effect in column 3 is slightly larger than our baseline estimate. These results 
alleviate concerns that observations with a Taxwedge of zero might affect our results and that 
our findings might not generalize beyond investing entities located in tax havens.  
                                                 
25 From the home countries in Panel A of Table 2, we drop observations of investing entities located in the British 
Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, and Switzerland (see Gravelle 2009).  
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In column 5, we separately include the two components of Taxwedge: (i) the dividend-
withholding tax (Wht) and (ii) the corporate income tax levied or the tax credit granted in the 
home country of the investing entity (HomeTax). We find positive and significant coefficients 
for components (p = 0.02). These results suggest that the tax sensitivity of an MNC is not 
limited to the dividend-withholding tax. Investing entity consider the tax treatment of foreign 
income in the home country when selecting an organizational form for a new affiliate.26  
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
5 Results for Economic Consequences of Organizational Form Choices 
Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 10, we report descriptive statistics for the economic consequences sample and 
present results for tests of differences in means and medians between subsidiaries and flow-
throughs. Recall that this sample includes any observation available for a new affiliate in the 
MiDi database for the sample period 2005 to 2013. As expected and in line with H4, a new 
affiliate established as a flow-through exhibits lower risk raking (RiskTaking, p < 0.01), lower 
investment (Investment, p = 0.01), and a lower profitability (Roa, p < 0.01) than a new 
affiliate established as a subsidiary. In addition, a flow-through holds fewer affiliates in 
Germany (Complexity, p <0.01), which is consistent with a less complex group structure.  
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
In Table 11, we report Pearson coefficients for univariate correlations between our 
dependent and independent variables. Flow-Through exhibits a negative correlation with three 
out of four dependent variables (RiskTaking, Roa, and Complexity), which is significant at the 
one-percent level. The correlation between Flow-Through and Investment is negative but 
                                                 
26 In additional tests (untabulated), we drop observations if the new affiliate is established in a regulated industry 
and observations if the parent is located in a tax haven (Gravelle 2009). We continue to find positive and significant 
coefficients on Taxwedge in both tests, which further supports the robustness of our results.  
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insignificant (p = 0.03). These correlations are in line with the descriptive statistics in 
Table 10 and generally consistent with our expectations.  
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
Tests of H4: Economic Consequences of Organizational Form Choices 
Testing H4 and examining the economic consequences of organizational form choices 
raises endogeneity concerns, because self-selection into a subsidiary or a flow-through based 
on tax and non-tax costs and benefits of organizational forms could bias inferences from 
Equation (2). To address this concern, we follow Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and re-estimate 
Equation (1) on the organizational form choice sample using a probit regression. Results in 
Table 12, Panel A are very similar to our baseline findings. From this first-stage regression, 
we calculate the inverse mills ratio and include this measure as an additional control variable 
in second-stage regressions based on Equation (2).27  
Panel B presents results from estimating Equation (2) for all dependent variables. As 
predicted, Flow-Through is negatively associated with RiskTaking (p < 0.01), Roa (p = 0.01), 
and Complexity (p = 0.02). For Investment, the coefficient on Flow-Through is negative but 
insignificant (p = 0.81).28 These results support H4: Compared to a subsidiary, a new affiliate 
established as a flow-through takes on less risk, is less profitable, and is associated with a less 
complex group structure. Thus, the organizational form selected for cross-border investment 
could have economic consequences for the MNC and the new affiliate. 
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
                                                 
27 To obtain reliable estimates, this approach requires a variable that fulfills the exclusion restriction, i.e. a variable 
that affects the dependent variable in the second-stage regression only through the organizational form choice 
modelled in the first stage. We believe that Taxwedge fulfills this requirement in our setting because this variable 
captures the tax burden difference between organizational forms. This tax burden difference should not be directly 
associated with risk-taking, investment, profitability, or group-structure complexity. In fact, we find insignificant 
coefficients when including Taxwedge in Equation (2) (untabulated).  
28 The inverse mills ratio is insignificant in three out of four regressions, which suggests that our results do not 
seriously suffer from endogeneity concerns. 
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In Table 13, we test whether choosing an organizational form to exploit a tax benefit 
has distinct consequences for the new affiliate. To this end, we interact Flow-Through with 
Taxwedge in the year the new affiliate was established. Results for the main effect of Flow-
Through are similar to Table 12. However, the coefficient on Flow-Through#Taxwedge is 
negative and significant for Investment (p = 0.02) and positive and significant for Complexity 
(p < 0.01). These results suggest that selecting a flow-through because of a tax benefit is 
associated with lower investment and a more complex group structure. MNCs tend to 
establish a flow-through at the first layer of their group structure to reap a tax benefit while 
spreading risk associated with unlimited liability across affiliates held by the flow-through. 
INSERT TABLE 13 HERE 
6 Conclusion 
We examine the association between international taxation and organizational form 
choices of MNCs. Analyzing micro-level data on inbound FDI relations in Germany, we 
document that the tax burden difference between subsidiaries and flow-throughs is an 
economically important determinant of these decisions. This effect, which is comparable in 
magnitude to non-tax determinants, is weaker for MNCs with income-shifting opportunities 
and for organizational form choices subject to high industry-specific risk and large country-
level differences in regulatory quality. Investing entities with prior host-country experience 
are more sensitive to the tax burden difference. We also exploit a 2008 tax reform in Germany 
and find that a reduction in the tax cost of a subsidiary lowered the probability of establishing 
a new affiliate as a flow-through, providing support for a causal interpretation of our findings.  
We also shed light on the economic consequences of organizational form choices. Our 
results suggest that, compared to a subsidiary, a new affiliate established as a flow-through 
takes on less risk, is less profitable, and is associated with a less complex group structure. In 
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addition, we find that selecting a flow-through because of a tax benefit is associated with 
lower investment and a more complex group structure.  
Our findings offer several insights for researchers and policy makers interested in 
group structures of MNCs and the design of targeted tax rules for organizational forms. First, 
we add to studies on the determinants of organizational form choices. While prior research 
shows that non-tax factors tend to dominate organizational form choices in domestic settings, 
our findings suggest that taxes are an important determinant for MNCs. Thus, MNCs might 
respond more strongly to tax-law changes in their organizational form choices than domestic 
or standalone firms. Second, we extend research on group structures of MNCs by showing 
that international taxation is associated with the organizational form of foreign affiliates. 
Host-country tax rules might not only attract cross-border investment but also shape its 
organizational form. Third, we show that organizational form choices and differences in the 
taxation of organizational forms could have economic consequences and that the legal form 
selected for FDI might indicate differences in risk-taking or investment within MNCs.   
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Appendix A: Variable Descriptions 
Dependent Variables 
Flow-Through Indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate i is established 
in year t as a flow-through, and zero otherwise (i.e. as a subsidiary). 
Source: MiDi-Database, variable re1 = 3 or 4, Schild and Walter (2017).   
RiskTaking Risk-taking of affiliate i in year t as standard deviation of Roa over the 
three-year period t to t+2 and adjusted for the industry-year mean of 
RiskTaking (based on one-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry codes). Source: 
variable Roa.   
Investment Investment of affiliate i in year t as change in fixed and intangible assets 
from year t-1 to t and divided by total assets in year t-1. Source: MiDi-
Database, variables (p11[t]–p11[t-1])/p40[t-1]*100, Schild and Walter 
(2017).   
Roa Return on assets of affiliate i in year t as net profit in year t and divided 
by total assets in year t. Source: MiDi-Database, variables p32/p40, 
Schild and Walter (2017).   
Complexity Natural logarithm of the number of inbound FDI relations held by 
affiliate i in Germany in year t. Source: MiDi-Database, natural 
logarithm of the sum of variable nu2, Schild and Walter (2017).   
Tax Variables  
Taxwedge Tax cost of a subsidiary for foreign income earned in affiliate i in year t. 
The variable is calculated conditional on the home country of the 
investing entity. We collect information from Worldwide Corporate Tax 
Guides and domestic tax law. Source: Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides 
2005-2013, Ernst & Young (2005-2013); own calculations.   
Wht Dividend-withholding tax levied in Germany on a subsidiary’s dividend 
distributions in year t. The variable is calculated conditional on the home 
country of the investing entity. We collect information from German tax 
law and double tax treaties in place between Germany and the home 
country of the investing entity. Source: German Double Tax Treaties, 
German Domestic Tax Law.   
HomeTax Corporate income tax levied or tax credit granted in the home country of 
the investing entity on foreign income earned in affiliate i in year t. The 
variable is calculated conditional on the home country of the investing 
entity. We collect information from Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides 
and domestic tax law. Source: Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides 2005-
2013, Ernst & Young (2005-2013); own calculations.   
Control Variables: Determinants of Organizational Form Choices 
LN(Employ) Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of employees of affiliate i in year 
t. Source: MiDi-Database, variable ln(1+p05), Schild and Walter (2017).   
LN(Assets) Natural logarithm of 1 plus total assets of affiliate i in year t. Source: 
MiDi-Database, variable ln(1+p40), Schild and Walter (2017).   
LossYear Indicator variable with the value of one if affiliate i reports a loss in year 
t, and zero otherwise. Source: MiDi-Database, variable p32 < 0, Schild 
and Walter (2017).   
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Leverage Debt ratio of affiliate i in year t as total debt in year t and divided by total 
assets in year t. Source: MiDi-Database, variables p33/p40, Schild and 
Walter (2017).   
Brownfield  Indicator variable with the value of one if affiliate i is established in year 
t through M&A, and zero otherwise (i.e. through greenfield investment). 
Source: MiDi-Database, variable em1= 2, Schild and Walter (2017).   
Distribution  Indicator variable with the value of one if affiliate i distributes profit in 
year t+1, and zero otherwise. We identify distributions as a reduction in 
total equity from year t to t+1 (total equity in year t + profit in year t + 
retained profit in year t – total equity in year t+1 – retained profit in year 
t+1). Source: MiDi-Database, Distribution = variables 
p23[t]+p29[t]+p30[t]+p32[t]+p31[t]–p23[t+1]–p29[t+1] –p30[t+1]–
p31[t+1], Schild and Walter (2017).   
InternDebt Internal debt ratio of affiliate i in year t as intra-firm debt in year t and 
divided by total assets in year t. Source: MiDi-Database, variables 
p34/p40 (for sample years 2005-2008) and (p35+p37)/p40 (for sample 
years 2009-2013), Schild and Walter (2017).   
Intangibles  Indicator variable with the value of one if affiliate i is established in year 
t in an intangible-asset intensive industry, and zero otherwise. We 
classify industries according to the following NACE Rev. 2 industry 
codes as intangible-asset intensive: 1900, 2000, 2100, 2600, 2700, 2800, 
2900, 5800, 5900, 6000, 6100, 6200, 6300. Source: MiDi-Database, 
variable br1, Schild and Walter (2017).   
NumInv Number of inbound FDI relations of the investing entity in Germany in 
year t. Source: MiDi-Database, sum of variable nu4, Schild and Walter 
(2017).   
Holdings Percentage of shares held by the investing entity in affiliate i in year t. 
Source: MiDi-Database, variable bgu, Schild and Walter (2017).   
DirectFDI Indicator variable with the value of one if the investing entity is located 
in the same country as the parent in year t, and zero otherwise. Source: 
MiDi-Database, variables lan = la4, Schild and Walter (2017).    
LN(Dist) Natural logarithm of the distance in kilometers between the capital city 
of the parent home country and Germany. Source: Gleditsch (2013).   
DiffRegQuality Difference in regulatory quality between Germany and the parent home 
country in year t. Regulatory quality is measured in annual percentile 
ranks. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 2005-2013, World 
Bank (2005-2013).   
LegorUK Indicator variable with the value of one if the parent home country legal 
system is of British legal origin, and zero otherwise. Source: LaPorta et 
al. (2008).   
LegorFR Indicator variable with the value of one if the parent home country legal 
system is of French legal origin, and zero otherwise. Source: LaPorta et 
al. (2008).   
LegorSC Indicator variable with the value of one if the parent home country legal 
system is of Scandinavian legal origin, and zero otherwise. Source: 
LaPorta et al. (2008).   
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929347 
39 
Control Variables: Economic Consequences of Organizational Form Choices 
PE-Ratio Price-to-earnings ratio for all publicly listed firms operating in the same 
industry as affiliate i. PE-Ratio is calculated for year t as the median of 
monthly price-to-earnings ratios. Source: Datastream.   
LN(Sales) Natural logarithm of 1 plus total sales of affiliate i in year t. Source: 
MiDi-Database, variable ln(1+p04*1000), Schild and Walter (2017).   
Cash Cash holdings of affiliate i in year t as assets other than fixed assets, 
intangible assets, financial assets, and current assets in the form of claims 
in year t and divided by total assets in year t. Source: MiDi-Database, 
variable p21/p40, Schild and Walter (2017).   
Age Age of affiliate i in year t as year t less the year in which affiliate i was 
established. Source: MiDi-Database, jhr, Schild and Walter (2017).   
Partitioning and Difference-in-Differences Variables 
HighIntDebt Indicator variable with the value of one if the ratio of intra-firm debt 
provided by foreign affiliates to total assets of affiliate i in year t is above 
the sample median, and zero otherwise. Source: MiDi-Database, variables 
p37/p40, Schild and Walter (2017).   
HighIndRisk Indicator variable with the value of one if affiliate i is established in year t 
in the manufacturing or wholesale industry, and zero otherwise. 
Manufacturing denotes industry classification C and wholesale industry 
classification G (one-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry codes). Source: MiDi-
Database, variable br1, Schild and Walter (2017).   
HighRegDiff Indicator variable with the value of one if the difference in the regulatory 
quality between Germany and the parent home country in year t is above 
the sample median, and zero otherwise. Source: variable DiffRegQuality.    
HighExp Indicator variable with the value of one if the investing entity holds at least 
one additional inbound FDI relation in Germany in year t, and zero 
otherwise. Source: variable NumInv.    
Reform Indicator variable with the value of one if the 2008 tax reform in Germany 
led to a change in Taxwedge for the home country of the investing entity, 
and zero if Taxwedge for the home country of the investing entity is equal 
to zero for the entire sample period. Source: variable Taxwedge.    
Post Indicator variable with the value of one for sample years after the 2008 tax 
reform in Germany (i.e. year 2008 or later), and zero for sample years 
before the 2008 tax reform. Source: variable jhr.    
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Appendix B: Tax Cost of a Subsidiary  
As outlined in Section 2, foreign income earned in a subsidiary and a flow-through is subject 
to three layers of international taxation. The first layer is the corporate income tax 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 in the 
host country (Layer 1 in Figure 1). While a subsidiary is subject to unlimited tax liability in 
the host country, the investing entity faces limited tax liability when choosing a flow-through. 
In both cases, the host country taxes income earned at 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 (Article 7 OECD Model Tax 
Convention, OECD 2017). For Germany, 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 is equal to 38.6 percent for the first sample 
years but reduces to 29.8 percent after 2007. These tax rates include a solidarity surcharge and 
the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer) levied by German municipalities. We use average tax 
rates because municipalities enjoy some leeway in setting local business tax rates. 
The second layer is the dividend-withholding tax 𝜏𝑤 levied on a subsidiary’s 
dividend distributions (Layer 2 in Figure 1). This tax applies when profit is distributed to the 
investing entity. Thus, 𝜏𝑤 has the character of a shareholder-level tax (Scholes et al. 2014, 
Utke 2019) and a repatriation tax (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2001). The German tax rate on 
distributions to non-EU countries and to countries without a double tax treaty was 26.4 
percent for the first sample years but decreased to 15.8 percent as from 2009. For home 
countries that have singed a double tax treaty with Germany, 𝜏𝑤 ranges from 5 to 15 percent. 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive abolishes 𝜏𝑤 for dividend distributions to EU countries.
29 A 
flow-through is not subject to this layer of international taxation.30  
The third layer is the corporate income tax 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 in the home country (Layer 3 in 
Figure 1). To mitigate double taxation, the home country either exempts foreign income 
from 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 (territorial tax system) or taxes foreign income at 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 while granting a tax 
                                                 
29 This exemption applies to investing entities that hold at least 10 percent of the shares in a subsidiary. Since we 
limit our analysis to investing entities that hold at least 25 percent in the new affiliate (see Section 3.2), dividend-
withholding tax rates for investing entities located in the EU are equal to zero in our sample. 
30 Some countries might levy a tax on the profit distributions of a branch to equally tax subsidiaries and branches. 
Such a tax, however, does not apply in our setting. 
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credit for 𝜏𝑤 and 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 (worldwide tax system). In rare cases, the home country taxes foreign 
income at 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 without granting relief from double taxation.  
Territorial tax systems differ in the extent to which foreign income is exempt from 
𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒. Home countries may fully exempt foreign income or tax a fraction 𝑤 at 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒. Thus, 
for an investing entity from a home country with a territorial tax system, the effective tax 
burden on foreign income earned in a subsidiary 𝑇𝑆 or in a flow-through 𝑇𝐹 is given by 
𝑇𝑆 =⁡𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝜏𝑤 +⁡(1 − 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝑤 ∗ 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒, 
𝑇𝐹 =⁡𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 +⁡(1 − 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝑤 ∗ 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒. 
Under a worldwide tax system, the home country taxes foreign income earned in a 
subsidiary when distributed to the investing entity. To mitigate double taxation, the home 
country grants a tax credit, which is limited to 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒. In case of a direct tax credit, 𝜏𝑤 is 
credited and the investing entity is subject to home county corporate income tax in excess of 
(1 − 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝜏𝑤. An indirect tax credit also includes 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡, and the investing entity is subject 
to home country corporate income tax in excess of 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝜏𝑤. In case of a 
flow-through, the home country taxes foreign income when earned and grants a tax credit for 
𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡. The investing entity is subject to home country corporate income tax in excess of 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡. 
For an investing entity from a home country with a worldwide tax system, the effective tax 
burden on foreign income earned in a subsidiary 𝑇𝑆 or in a flow-through 𝑇𝐹 is given by 
𝑇𝑆 = ⁡max⁡{𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝜏𝑤; ⁡⁡𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒}, (direct tax credit) 
𝑇𝑆 = ⁡max⁡{𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) ∗ 𝜏𝑤; ⁡⁡𝜏𝑐




Some home countries neither exempt foreign income from 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 nor grant a tax credit 
for 𝜏𝑤 and 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡, which results in double taxation of foreign income. For an investing entity 
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from a home country that does not grant any relief from double taxation, the effective tax 
burden on foreign income earned in a subsidiary 𝑇𝑆 or in a flow-through 𝑇𝐹 is given by 
𝑇𝑆 =⁡𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑐





In the table below, we derive the tax burden difference between organizational forms 
and determine the tax cost of a subsidiary for each home country tax system. As discussed in 
Section 2, a subsidiary induces a higher tax burden equal to the dividend-withholding tax if 
the investing entity is located in a home country with a territorial tax system or in a home 
country that does not grant any relief from double taxation. If the investing entity is located 
in a home country with a worldwide tax system, tax cost of a subsidiary depends on the 
corporate income tax rates in the host and the home country and the tax credit granted.  
Home Country Tax System Tax Cost of a Subsidiary (TS – TF) 
Territorial tax system   (1 – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) * τw   
Worldwide tax system (direct tax credit)    
 if  𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 > 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 > τw  (1 – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) * τw  
 if  𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 > 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 ˄ τw > 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  (1 – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) * τw  
 if   𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 > 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 ˄  𝜏𝑐




 * τw  
 if  τw > 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 > 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 + (1 – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) * τw – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  
Worldwide tax system (indirect tax credit)    
 if  𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡
  > 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  (1 – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) * τw  
 if   𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 > 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡
  + (1 – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) * τw > 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡  0  
 if  𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡
  + (1 – 𝜏𝑐




  + (1 – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) * τw – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  
No relief from double taxation (1 – 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) * τw 
  
Note: This table presents the tax burden difference between a subsidiary and a flow-through. We derive the 
tax cost of a subsidiary for each home country tax system. TS is the tax burden on foreign income earned in 
a subsidiary and TF on foreign income earned in a flow-through, respectively. 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the statutory corporate 
income tax rate in the host country. The host country taxes income earned in a subsidiary and a flow-through 
at 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡. τw is the statutory dividend-withholding tax rate on a subsidiary’s dividend distributions. This tax 
does not apply on a flow-through. 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  is the statutory corporate income tax rate in the home country. To 
mitigate double taxation, the home country either exempts foreign income from tax (territorial tax system) 
or taxes foreign income at the home country corporate income tax rate while granting a tax credit for the 
dividend-withholding tax and the host country corporate income tax (worldwide tax system with direct or 
indirect tax credit). Some countries do not grant relief from double taxation. 
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Appendix C: Overview of Organizational Forms in Germany 
The following table provides an overview of the organizational forms available to an MNC 
in Germany. We describe the characteristics of the organizational forms for commercial law 




A branch (permanent establishment) is the place through which 
an enterprise carries out its business (§ 13 German commercial 
code). The enterprise establishing a branch is subject to unlimited 
liability under commercial law. A branch has no legal personality 
for domestic or international tax purposes. Germany taxes income 
generated by a German branch while taking any double tax treaty 
into account (see Article 7 OECD Model Tax Convention). For 
domestic and international tax purposes, income of a branch is 
attributed to the enterprise establishing the branch. No dividend-
withholding taxes apply when profits flow to the enterprise 
establishing the branch. 
OHG  
(= General Partnership) 
An OHG is a general partnership operated by two or more parties 
that are subject to unlimited liability under commercial law. An 
OHG has no legal personality for domestic and international tax 
purposes. The tax treatment of an OHG is identical to a branch.  
KG  
(= Limited Partnership) 
A KG is a limited partnership operated by two or more parties 
where at least one party is subject to unlimited liability under 
commercial law. The liability of the other party is limited to the 
equity stake in the partnership. A KG has no legal personality for 
domestic and international tax purposes. The tax treatment of a 
KG is identical to a branch.  
Subsidiaries  
AG  
(= Corporation eligible 
for having its shares 
traded on a stock 
exchange) 
An AG is a corporation established under German corporate law 
as has at least one shareholder. An AG is eligible for having its 
shares traded on a stock exchange. Shareholders of an AG are 
subject to limited liability under commercial law. An AG has 
legal personality for domestic and international tax purposes. 
Germany taxes income generated by an AG registered or head-
quartered in Germany. Profit distributions to shareholders are 
subject to a dividend-withholding tax.  
GmbH  
(= Corporation not 
eligible for having its 
shares traded on a stock 
exchange) 
A GmbH is a corporation established under German corporate 
law and has at least one shareholder. In contrast to an AG, a 
GmbH is not eligible for having its shares traded on the stock 
exchange. The liability consequences and the tax treatment are 
identical to an AG.  
Societas Europae  
(= Corporation under 
corporate law of the 
European Union) 
The societas europaea is a corporation established under the 
corporate law of the European Union and has at least one 
shareholder. The liability consequences and the tax treatment are 
identical to an AG.  
  



















Note: This figure outlines the three layers of international taxation. The investing entity selects an organizational 
form for a new affiliate in the host country (Germany). The investing entity is part of an MNC and located either 
in the same country as the parent (e.g., the United States: direct investment) or in a different country (e.g., 
Luxembourg: indirect investment). The three layers of international taxation determine the tax burden on foreign 
income earned in a subsidiary and a flow-through, respectively. Layer 1 is the statutory corporate income tax in 
the host country (𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡). The host country taxes income earned in a subsidiary and a flow-through at 𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡. Layer 2 
is the statutory dividend-withholding tax (𝜏𝑤) levied on a subsidiary’s dividend distributions. This tax does not 
apply to a flow-through. Layer 3 is the statutory corporate income tax in the home country (𝜏𝑐
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒). The home 
county taxes foreign income when earned in the host country or when repatriated to the investing entity. To 
mitigate double taxation, the home country either exempts foreign income from tax (territorial tax system) or taxes 
foreign income at the home country corporate income tax rate while granting a tax credit for the dividend-
withholding tax and the host country corporate income tax (worldwide tax system with direct or indirect tax credit). 



























ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒   




Sample Selection (Organizational Form Choice Sample) 
Data Restrictions Observations 
First observation of inbound investment in Germany (years 1999-2013) 18,265 
Less observations before 2005 -12,206 
Less observations where the main investor holds < 25 percent of the shares -360 
Less observations with insufficient data to calculate Taxwedge  -19 
Less observations of pre-existing firms -3,498 
Organizational Form Choice Sample 2,182 
Note: This table presents the sample selection for the organizational form choice sample. The sample 
includes the first observation of a new affiliate in Germany (sample years 2005-2013). We define variables 
in the Appendix. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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Table 2     
Sample Composition  










Austria 0.00 131 34 165 
Belgium 1.11 25 8 33 
British Virgin Islands 13.12 6 0 6 
Canada 3.19 9 3 12 
China 6.53 25 3 28 
Cyprus 1.56 19 3 22 
Czech Republic 6.21 5 0 5 
Denmark 0.00 36 18 54 
Finland 0.00 18 0 18 
France 0.00 80 17 97 
Ireland 0.00 18 6 24 
Italy 0.95 35 9 44 
Jersey 13.12 12 24 36 
Liechtenstein 9.10 4 8 12 
Luxembourg 0.00 367 133 500 
Malaysia 3.27 3 0 3 
Mauritius 3.27 3 0 3 
Mexico 3.19 3 0 3 
Netherlands 0.00 237 85 322 
Norway 0.33 10 3 13 
Republic of Korea 16.68 8 0 8 
Russian Federation 11.35 3 0 3 
Spain -0.02 31 5 36 
Sweden 0.00 38 4 42 
Switzerland 0.00 135 55 190 
United Kingdom 0.00 130 45 175 
United States 0.93 128 24 152 
Additional Observations  130 46 176 
Total   1,649 533 2,182 
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Panel B: Observations by Sample Year 
Years Subsidiaries Flow-Throughs Total 
2005 136 25 161 
2006 274 37 311 
2007 240 66 306 
2008 187 70 257 
2009 141 56 197 
2010 126 30 156 
2011 192 51 243 
2012 174 100 274 
2013 179 98 277 
Total 1,649 533 2,182 
    
Panel C: Observations by Industry 
Industries Subsidiaries Flow-Throughs Total 
Manufacturing 287 46 333 
Energy Supply 25 58 83 
Construction 237 147 384 
Wholesale 137 11 148 
Transportation 36 11 47 
Information and Communication 41 7 48 
Financial Services 481 154 635 
Professional Services 325 78 403 
Other Services 80 21 101 
Total 1,649 533 2,182 
Note: This table presents information on the sample composition. Panel A presents the mean tax cost 
of a subsidiary (Taxwedge) and the number of observations by home country of the investing entity. 
In line with Deutsche Bundesbank’s confidentiality rules, we present home countries with a 
minimum of three observations per organizational form that result from three distinct investing 
entities. Our sample includes another 32 home countries that do not fulfill this confidentiality 
requirement. These observations are summarized under Additional Observations. Panel B presents 
observations by sample year. Panel C presents observations by industry. Industry classification is 
based on one-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry codes. We define variables in the Appendix. Source: 
Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct 
Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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Table 3   
Descriptive Statistics (Organizational Form Choice Sample)   
 Full Sample  
Subsidiaries  
(N = 1,649) 
 Flow-Throughs  
(N = 533) 
    
Variables N Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  t-statistics  z-statistics 
Flow-Through 2,182 0.244 0.430  0.000 0.000  1.000 0.000     
Taxwedge 2,182 1.137 3.479  0.996 3.157  1.573 4.300  -2.862***     -0.643    
LN(Employ) 2,182 1.577 2.143  1.725 2.188  1.118 1.926  6.109***     6.351***    
LN(Assets) 2,182 17.280 1.558  17.300 1.567  17.200 1.527  1.355     1.402    
LossYear 2,182 0.527 0.499  0.563 0.496  0.413 0.493  6.124***     6.053***    
Leverage 2,182 0.654 0.574  0.652 0.575  0.661 0.572  -0.290     -0.078    
Roa 2,182 -0.027 0.190  -0.015 0.166  -0.064 0.247  4.306***     -0.002    
Brownfield 2,182 0.518 0.500  0.530 0.499  0.482 0.500  1.921*     1.921*    
Distribution 2,182 0.227 0.419  0.200 0.400  0.313 0.464  -5.083***     -5.449***    
InternDebt 2,182 0.309 0.364  0.331 0.365  0.240 0.352  5.123***     5.431***    
Intangibles 2,182 0.109 0.311  0.127 0.333  0.051 0.220  6.105***     4.946***    
NumInv 2,182 3.651 7.680  2.796 5.500  6.296 11.780  -6.630***     -7.859***    
Holdings 2,182 0.918 0.181  0.928 0.172  0.886 0.202  4.341***     7.163***    
DirectFDI 2,182 0.754 0.431  0.778 0.416  0.681 0.467  4.282***     4.521***    
LN(Dist) 2,182 6.506 1.912  6.603 1.835  6.209 2.107  3.871***     3.056***    
DiffRegQuality 2,182 3.045 12.970  3.330 13.120  2.163 12.460  1.854*     1.997**    
LegorUK 2,182 0.234 0.424  0.230 0.421  0.248 0.432  -1.660*     -1.682*    
LegorFR 2,182 0.489 0.500  0.485 0.500  0.505 0.500  2.183**     2.145**    
LegorSC 2,182 0.059 0.236  0.063 0.243  0.047 0.212  1.128     1.069    
Wht 2,182 2.010 5.115   1.856 4.712   2.487 6.180   -2.164**      -0.030    
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the organizational form choice sample. We present means and standard deviations for dependent and 
independent variables. We present results for the full sample and separately for subsidiaries and flow-throughs. We conduct a two-sample t-test assuming unequal 
variances (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) to compare means (medians) between subsamples. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. We 
define variables in the Appendix. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service 
Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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Table 4 
Correlation Table (Organizational Form Choice Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) Flow-Through 1.00                   
(2) Taxwedge 0.07*   1.00                  
(3) LN(Employ) -0.12*    0.00    1.00                 
(4) LN(Assets) -0.03    -0.07*    0.07*    1.00                
(5) LossYear -0.13*    -0.03    -0.16*    -0.03    1.00               
(6) Leverage 0.01    0.00    -0.07*    -0.20*    0.20*    1.00              
(7) Roa -0.11*    0.02    0.03    0.14*    -0.42*    -0.44*    1.00             
(8) Brownfield -0.04    0.02    0.25*    -0.02    -0.11*    0.04    -0.02    1.00            
(9) Distribution 0.12*    0.04    0.05    0.04    -0.24*    -0.10*    0.13*    0.09*    1.00           
(10) InternDebt -0.11*    -0.03    -0.09*    -0.02    0.21*    0.47*    -0.23*    0.00    -0.13*    1.00          
(11) Intangibles -0.11*    0.03    0.45*    -0.07*    -0.11*    -0.06*    0.05    0.16*    0.00    -0.08*    1.00         
(12) NumInv 0.20*    -0.08*    -0.22*    -0.19*    0.03    0.25*    -0.18*    0.08*    0.02*    -0.12*    -0.11*    1.00        
(13) Holdings -0.10*    -0.11*    -0.05    -0.01    0.10*    0.06*    -0.02    -0.06*    -0.05    0.15*    -0.07*    0.02    1.00       
(14) DirectFDI -0.10*    0.04    -0.01    -0.13*    -0.01    -0.01    0.07*    -0.04    -0.04    -0.07*    0.00    0.00    -0.11*    1.00      
(15) LN(Dist) -0.09*    0.22*    0.16*    0.02    -0.04    -0.05    0.03    0.05    -0.03    0.08*    0.10*    -0.20*    0.01    -0.11*    1.00     
(16) DiffRegQuality -0.04    0.46*    0.11*    -0.05    -0.04    0.03    -0.01    0.02    0.00    0.02    0.07*    -0.09*    -0.06*    -0.06*    0.31*    1.00    
(17) LegorUK 0.04    0.17*    0.01*    0.08*    0.03    0.00    -0.06*    0.06*    0.02    0.10*    0.01    -0.08*    0.07*    -0.40*    0.52*    0.07*    1.00   
(18) LegorFR -0.05    -0.15*    -0.07*    0.00    0.04    0.02    0.02    -0.06*    0.01    -0.09*    -0.08*    0.06*    -0.01    0.31*    -0.44*    -0.09*    -0.54*    1.00  
(19) LegorSC -0.02    -0.08*    0.00*    -0.02    0.02    0.03    0.00    0.01    -0.03    0.06*    -0.01    -0.06*    0.04    0.10*    0.05    -0.13*    -0.18*    -0.19*    1.00    
Note: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the organizational form choice sample. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. We define 
variables in the Appendix. * represents a significance level of 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Micro-database Direct 
Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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Table 5 
Baseline Results: Tax Burden Difference and Organizational Form Choices 
 Flow-Through Flow-Through 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Coef./(SE) ME  Coef./(SE) ME 
Taxwedge 0.250***    0.042  0.265***    0.041 
 (0.076)     (0.075)    
LN(Employ) -0.200***    -0.034  0.001    0.000 
 (0.077)     (0.098)    
LN(Assets) -0.012    -0.002  0.060    0.009 
 (0.067)     (0.071)    
LossYear -1.008***    -0.172  -1.030***    -0.164 
 (0.177)     (0.163)    
Leverage -0.093    -0.016  -0.238**    -0.037 
 (0.070)     (0.095)    
Roa -0.481***    -0.081  -0.492***    -0.077 
 (0.090)     (0.089)    
Brownfield -0.215    -0.036  -0.454***    -0.071 
 (0.165)     (0.151)    
Distribution 0.410***    0.073  0.350**    0.058 
 (0.147)     (0.151)    
InternDebt -0.206**    -0.035  -0.150    -0.023 
 (0.097)     (0.097)    
Intangibles -0.752***    -0.106  -0.821**    -0.105 
 (0.250)     (0.364)    
NumInv 0.265*    0.044  0.211    0.033 
 (0.160)     (0.141)    
Holdings -0.195***    -0.033  -0.205***    -0.032 
 (0.058)     (0.058)    
DirectFDI -0.523***    -0.094  -0.462***    -0.077 
 (0.175)     (0.176)    
LN(Dist) -0.196**    -0.033  -0.083    -0.013 
 (0.091)     (0.084)    
DiffRegQuality -0.156*    -0.026  -0.171**    -0.027 
 (0.090)     (0.086)    
LegorUK 0.164    0.028  0.207    0.033 
 (0.248)     (0.226)    
LegorFR -0.187    -0.031  -0.115    -0.018 
 (0.283)     (0.237)    
LegorSC 0.090    0.015  -0.430    -0.060 
 (0.327)     (0.359)    
Intercept -0.273      0.352     
 (0.255)     (0.374)    
Year-FE  N   Y 
Industry-FE  N   Y 
N 2,182  2,182 
Pseudo R² 0.129  0.208 
Area under ROC 
curve 
0.726  0.789 
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Note: This table presents results for the association between the tax burden difference 
and organizational form choices. The dependent variable, Flow-Through, is an 
indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is established as a flow-
through, and zero otherwise. Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) report coefficients (marginal 
effects) for a logistic regression based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal effects 
while holding continuous variables at their means. We standardize independent 
variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating 
regressions. The regression in column 1 (3) is estimated without (with) year and 
industry-fixed effects. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. We calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the 
investing-entity level. We define variables in the Appendix. *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research 
Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct 
Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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Table 6 
Cross-Sectional Results: Income-Shifting Opportunities  
  Flow-Through  Flow-Through 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
   Coef./(SE) ME  Coef./(SE) ME 
Taxwedge β1  0.385***    0.059     0.293***    0.046    
  (0.082)     (0.079)    
HighIntDebt  -0.143*    -0.022       
  (0.085)       
Taxwedge#HighIntDebt β3  -0.292***    -0.045       
  (0.097)       
Intangibles  -0.774**    -0.099     -0.651*    -0.086    
  (0.364)     (0.368)    
Taxwedge#Intangibles β5     -0.168*    -0.026    
     (0.094)    
Additional Controls  Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y 
Industry-FE   Y   Y 
N  2,182  2,182 
Pseudo R²  0.217  0.210 
Area under ROC curve   0.792   0.790 
F-Test: β1+β3=0  0.830  - 
F-Test: β1+β5=0  -  1.330 
p-Value   0.362   0.248 
Note: This table presents results for cross-sectional tests based on income-shifting 
opportunities. The dependent variable, Flow-Through, is an indicator variable with the 
value of one if the new affiliate is established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise. 
HighIntDebt is an indicator variable with the value of one if the ratio of intra-firm debt 
provided by foreign affiliates to total assets of the new affiliate is above the sample median, 
and zero otherwise. Intangibles is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new 
affiliate is established in an intangible-asset intensive industry, and zero otherwise. 
Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) report coefficients (marginal effects) for a logistic regression 
based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at 
their means. We standardize independent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions are estimated with year and 
industry-fixed effects. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
We calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity 
level. We define variables in the Appendix. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre 
(RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the 
years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929347 
53 
Table 7 
Cross-Sectional Results: Non-Tax Factors 
 Flow-Through Flow-Through Flow-Through 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  Coef./(SE) ME  Coef./(SE) ME  Coef./(SE) ME 
Taxwedge β1  0.381***    0.052  0.423***    0.066  0.173**    0.027 
  (0.111)     (0.129)     (0.076)    
HighIndRisk  -0.456**    -0.062       
  (0.232)          
Taxwedge#HighIndRisk β3  -0.245*    -0.033       
  (0.143)          
HighRegDiff     0.031    0.005    
     (0.189)       
Taxwedge#HighRegDiff β5     -0.264*    -0.041    
     (0.138)       
HighExp        0.034    0.005 
        (0.105)    
Taxwedge#HighExp β7        0.218***    0.034 
        (0.081)    
Additional Controls  Y  Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y   Y 
Industry-FE   Y   Y   Y 
N  1,416  2,182  2,182 
Pseudo R²  0.236  0.208  0.209 
Area under ROC curve   0.811   0.787   0.791 
F-Test: β1+β3=0  0.890  -  - 
F-Test: β1+β5=0  -  4.300     - 
F-Test: β1+β7=0  -  -  15.780    
p-Value   0.347   0.038**   < 0.001*** 
Note: This table presents results for cross-sectional tests based on non-tax factors. We drop regulated 
industries (industry classification D, J, and K based on one-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry codes) in columns 
1-2. The dependent variable, Flow-Through, is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new 
affiliate is established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise. HighIndRisk is an indicator variable with the 
value of one if the new affiliate is established in the manufacturing or the wholesale industry, and zero 
otherwise. HighRegDiff is an indicator variable with the value of one if the difference in the regulatory 
quality between Germany and the parent home country is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
HighExp is an indicator variable with the value of one if the investing entity holds at least one additional 
inbound FDI relation in Germany, and zero otherwise. Columns 1, 3, and 5 (2, 4, and 6) report coefficients 
(marginal effects) for a logistic regression based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal effects while 
holding continuous variables at their means. We standardize independent variables to have a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions are estimated with year and 
industry-fixed effects. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. We calculate 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity level. We define variables in the 
Appendix. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct 
Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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Table 8 
Difference-in-Differences Analysis: 2008 Tax Reform in Germany 
  Flow-Through  Flow-Through  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
    Coef./(SE) ME  Coef./(SE) ME  
Reform  0.870***    0.154  0.986**    0.177  
  (0.298)     (0.400)     
Post  1.017***    0.146     
  (0.323)        
Reform#Post  -0.655*    -0.089     
  (0.349)        
Reform#Year2005     -0.803    -0.097  
     (0.715)     
Reform#Year2006     0.145    0.023  
     (0.654)     
Reform#Year2008     -0.823    -0.099  
     (0.615)     
Reform#Year2009     0.358    0.061  
     (0.569)     
Reform#Year2010     -1.392**    -0.140  
     (0.703)     
Reform#Year2011     -1.040*    -0.117  
     (0.625)     
Reform#Year2012     -1.103**    -0.122  
     (0.547)     
Reform#Year2013     -1.095*    -0.121  
          (0.578)      
Additional Controls  Y  Y  
Industry-FE  Y  Y  
Year-FE   Y   Y   
N  2,089  2,089  
Log-Likelihood  -919  -912  
Area under ROC 
curve 
 0.790  0.794  
Note: This table presents results for a DiD analysis of the 2008 tax reform in 
Germany. The dependent variable, Flow-Through, is an indicator variable with the 
value of one if the new affiliate is established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise. 
Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) report coefficients (marginal effects) for a logistic 
regression based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal effects while holding 
continuous variables at their means. We standardize independent variables to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All 
regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. We winsorize 
continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. We calculate heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity level. We define variables in 
the Appendix. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 
2013, own calculations. 
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Table 9 
Additional Robustness Tests 
  Flow-Through  Flow-Through  Flow-Through  Flow-Through  Flow-Through 
Analysis  Δ Taxwedge  One Affiliate  Drop Taxwedge=0  Drop Tax Haven  Withholding Tax 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
    ME/(SE)  ME/(SE)  ME/(SE)  ME/(SE)  ME/(SE) 
ΔTaxwedge  0.019*         
  (0.069)         
Taxwedge    0.027***     0.051**     0.029**      
    (0.078)    (0.192)    (0.085)     
Wht          0.383***    
          (0.109)   
HomeTax          0.210**    
                    (0.093)   
Additional Controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year-FE   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y 
N  1,905  1,665  417  1,331  2,182 
Pseudo R²  0.185  0.169  0.333  0.160  0.208 
Area under ROC curve  0.778  0.772  0.857  0.766  0.788 
Note: This table presents results for additional robustness tests. In column 1, we estimate Equation (1) using annual changes in Taxwedge. We drop 
observations if the investing entity establishes more than one new affiliate in our sample in column 2, observations with Taxwedge equal to zero in 
column 3, and observations if the investing entity is located in a tax haven in column 4. In column 5, we replace Taxwedge with Wht and HomeTax. 
The dependent variable, Flow-Through, is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is established as a flow-through, and zero 
otherwise. In all columns, we report marginal effects for a logistic regression based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal effects while holding 
continuous variables at their means. We standardize independent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating 
regressions. All regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. We 
calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity level. We define variables in the Appendix. *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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Table 10   
Descriptive Statistics (Economic Consequences Sample)   
Panel A: Dependent Variables      
 Full Sample  Subsidiaries   Flow-Throughs      
Variables N Mean SD  N Mean SD  N Mean SD  t-statistics  z-statistics 
RiskTaking 4,679 -0.001 0.122  3,748 0.004 0.127  931 -0.021 0.098  6.499***    8.865***    
Investment 6,770 0.300 10.140  5,362 0.438 10.300  1,408 -0.226 9.515  2.291**     5.029***    
Roa 6,770 -0.029 0.221  5,362 -0.035 0.242  1,408 -0.013 0.185  -3.543***     -3.732***    
Complexity 6,770 0.507 0.728  5,362 0.536 0.736  1,408 0.396 0.687  6.710***     7.816***    
                                
Panel B: Independent Variables      




PE-Ratio 6,770 17.310 4.175  5,362 17.320 3.965  1,408 17.260 4.896  0.414     1.498    
LN(Employ) 6,770 1.793 2.208  5,362 1.866 2.222  1,408 1.513 2.132  5.484***     6.007***    
LN(Assets) 6,770 17.470 10.150  5,362 17.430 1.548  1,408 17.580 1.645  -3.088***     -2.525**    
LossYear 6,770 0.457 0.498  5,362 0.499 0.500  1,408 0.298 0.458  14.336***     13.433***    
Leverage 6,770 0.641 0.480  5,362 0.663 0.479  1,408 0.555 0.475  7.545***     7.404***    
Roa 6,770 -0.023 0.211  5,362 -0.025 0.217  1,408 -0.015 0.189  -1.771*     -3.968***    
LN(Sales) 6,770 7.763 8.289  5,362 7.581 8.334  1,408 8.457 8.078  -3.597***     -1.368    
Investment 4,981 0.393 10.150  3,988 0.503 10.260  993 -0.050 9.646  1.594     3.423***    
Cash 6,770 0.012 0.045  5,362 0.012 0.043  1,408 0.016 0.053  -2.638***     1.153    
Age 6,770 3.079 1.875  5,362 3.131 1.896  1,408 2.881 1.782  4.620***     4.211***    
Taxwedge 6,770 1.244 3.626   5,362 0.949 3.011   1,408 2.369 5.209   -9.814***      -6.226***    
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the economic consequences sample. In Panel A (B), we present means and standard deviations for our dependent 
(independent) variables. We conduct a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) to compare means (medians) between subsamples. In Panel 
B, LN(Employ), LN(Assets), Leverage, Roa, LN(Sales), Investment, and Cash are lagged by one year. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
We define variables in the Appendix. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre 
(RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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Table 11 
Correlation Table (Economic Consequences Sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) RiskTaking 1.00                  
(2) Investment -0.02    1.00                 
(3) Roa -0.44*    0.03    1.00                
(4) Complexity 0.00    -0.02    0.01    1.00               
(5) Flow-Through -0.08*    -0.03    0.04*    -0.08*    1.00              
(6) PE-Ratio 0.01    -0.02    -0.01    0.04*    -0.01    1.00             
(7) LN(Employ) (Lag) -0.02    0.00    0.05*    -0.10*    -0.06*    -0.03    1.00            
(8) LN(Assets) (Lag) -0.04*    -0.01    0.04*    0.52*    0.04*    0.00    0.13*    1.00           
(9) LossYear 0.19*    0.02    -0.45*    0.01    -0.16*    -0.01    -0.17*    -0.08*    1.00          
(10) Leverage (Lag) 0.16*    -0.03    -0.25*    -0.13*    -0.09*    0.03    -0.11*    -0.20*    0.26*    1.00         
(11) Roa (Lag) -0.19*    0.01    0.40*    0.02    0.02    -0.02    0.03    0.10*    -0.27*    -0.42*    1.00        
(12) LN(Sales) (Lag) -0.01    -0.05*    0.05*    -0.22*    0.04*    -0.01    0.75*    0.02    -0.18*    -0.05*    0.04*    1.00       
(13) Investment (Lag) -0.02    0.19*    0.00    -0.02    -0.02    -0.01    0.04*    0.06*    0.02    -0.03    0.03    0.00    1.00      
(14) Cash (Lag) 0.07*    0.01    -0.04*    -0.10*    0.04*    -0.01    0.12*    -0.09*    0.01    0.03    -0.09*    0.11*    -0.01    1.00     
(15) Age -0.01    -0.08*    0.01    0.05*    -0.05*    0.18*    0.06*    0.07*    -0.02    0.02    -0.01    0.06*    -0.09*    0.00    1.00    
Note: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the economic consequences sample. We winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. We define 
variables in the Appendix. (Lag) denotes variables lagged by one year. * represents a significance level of 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Micro-database Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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Table 12 
Economic Consequences of Organizational Form Choices 
Panel A: Organizational Form Choice (First-Stage Probit Regression) 
  Flow-Through  
  (1)  
   Coef. / (SE)  
Taxwedge  0.152***  
  (0.044)    
LN(Employ)  0.010     
  (0.055)    
LN(Assets)  0.031     
  (0.040)    
LossYear  -0.577***  
  (0.089)    
Leverage  -0.265**  
  (0.114)    
Roa  -0.300***  
  (0.054)    
Brownfield  -0.253***  
  (0.084)    
Distribution  0.215**  
  (0.086)    
InternDebt  -0.096     
  (0.064)    
Intangibles  -0.448**  
  (0.196)    
NumInv  0.136     
  (0.095)    
Holdings  -0.115***  
  (0.033)    
DirectFDI  -0.272***  
  (0.100)    
LN(Dist)  -0.042     
  (0.049)    
DiffRegQuality  -0.096**  
  (0.048)    
Legor_UK  0.115     
  (0.127)    
Legor_FR  -0.049     
  (0.130)    
Legor_SC  -0.230     
  (0.198)    
Intercept  -0.563     
  (0.399)    
Year-FE   Y  
Industry-FE   Y  
N  2,182  
Pseudo R²   0.204  
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Panel B: Economic Consequences (Second-Stage OLS Regression) 
 RiskTaking  Investment  Roa  Complexity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Coef./(SE)  Coef./(SE)  Coef./(SE)  Coef./(SE) 
Flow-Through -0.017***     -0.006     -0.023**     -0.113**    
 (0.006)    (0.423)    (0.010)    (0.048)   
PE-Ratio 0.002     -0.062     -0.004     0.013    
 (0.002)    (0.210)    (0.005)    (0.013)   
LN(Employ) -0.004     -0.011     -0.002     0.031    
 (0.005)    (0.326)    (0.007)    (0.034)   
LN(Assets) -0.003     0.200     0.004     0.290***    
 (0.003)    (0.162)    (0.005)    (0.024)   
LossYear 0.037***     0.368     -0.202***     0.025    
 (0.005)    (0.280)    (0.010)    (0.025)   
Leverage 0.011***     -0.244     -0.044***     -0.011    
 (0.004)    (0.174)    (0.008)    (0.016)   
Roa -0.015***     0.087       -0.023**    
 (0.003)    (0.186)      (0.009)   
LN(Sales) 0.007     -1.293***     -0.003     -0.052*    
 (0.005)    (0.321)    (0.006)    (0.027)   
Investment -0.003       0.002     -0.031***    
 (0.002)      (0.003)    (0.008)   
Cash 0.007**     0.201     -0.003     -0.028***    
 (0.003)    (0.137)    (0.004)    (0.010)   
Age -0.002     -0.994***     0.006     -0.009    
 (0.004)    (0.212)    (0.006)    (0.020)   
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.009     0.266     0.027***     0.032    
 (0.007)    (0.413)    (0.010)    -(0.044)   
Intercept 0.004     -0.913     0.011     0.372***    
 (0.015)    (1.265)    (0.018)    (0.087)   
Industry-FE Y   Y   Y   Y 
Year-FE Y   Y   Y   Y 
N 4,679  6,770  4,981  4,981 
Adjusted R2 0.075   0.028   0.245   0.445 
Note: This table presents results for economic consequences of organizational form choices. Panel A 
presents results from a first-stage probit regression based on Equation (1) on the organizational form 
choice sample. Panel B presents results from a second-stage OLS regression based on Equation (2) on 
the economic consequences sample adjusted for selection bias. In Panel A, the dependent variable, Flow-
Through, is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is established as a flow-
through, and zero otherwise. In Panel B, the dependent variable, RiskTaking, is the standard deviation 
of Roa of the new affiliate over the three-year period t to t+2 and adjusted for the industry-year mean 
(based on one-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry codes). Investment is the annual change in fixed and 
intangible assets of the new affiliate dividend by lagged total assets. Roa is the net profit of the new 
affiliate and divided by total assets. Complexity is the natural logarithm of the number of inbound FDI 
relations of the new affiliate in Germany. In Panel B, LN(Employ), LN(Assets), Leverage, Roa, 
LN(Sales), Investment, and Cash are lagged by one year. We standardize independent variables to have 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions are 
estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile. We calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity 
level. We define variables in the Appendix. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations.  
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Table 13 
Economic Consequences conditional on Taxwedge (Second-Stage OLS Regression) 
 RiskTaking  Investment  Roa  Complexity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Coef./(SE)  Coef./(SE)  Coef./(SE)  Coef./(SE) 
Flow-Through β1 -0.017***     0.166     -0.023**     -0.138***    
 (0.006)    (0.418)    (0.010)    (0.049)   
Taxwedge 0.001     0.201     0.003     -0.050***    
 (0.003)    (0.235)    (0.004)    (0.016)   
Flow-Through#Taxwedge β3 0.000     -0.538***     -0.002     0.083***    
 (0.003)    (0.210)    (0.005)    (0.019)   
Additional Controls Y   Y   Y   Y 
Industry-FE Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year-FE Y   Y   Y   Y 
N 4,679  6,770  4,981  4,981 
Adjusted R-squared 0.075   0.030   0.245   0.452 
Note: This table presents results for economic consequences of organizational form choices 
conditional on Taxwedge. We estimate a second-stage OLS regression based on Equation (2) on the 
economic consequences sample adjusted for selection bias. The dependent variable, RiskTaking, is the 
standard deviation of Roa of the new affiliate over the three-year period t to t+2 and adjusted for the 
industry-year mean (based on one-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry codes). Investment is the annual change 
in fixed and intangible assets of the new affiliate dividend by lagged total assets. Roa is the net profit 
of the new affiliate and divided by total assets. Complexity is the natural logarithm of the number of 
inbound FDI relations of the new affiliate in Germany. LN(Employ), LN(Assets), Leverage, Roa, 
LN(Sales), Investment, and Cash are lagged by one year. We standardize independent variables to have 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions are 
estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile. We calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity 
level. We define variables in the Appendix. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations. 
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